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The Terrorist’s Veto: Why the First Amendment 








On Wednesday, January 7, 2015, armed gunmen entered the offices of French 
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and killed employees and editors of the magazine in 
probable retaliation for the publication of satirical cartoons depicting the Prophet 
Muhammad.2 The attack on Charlie Hebdo has contributed to the debate over whether 
publication of speech that is likely to provoke violent reactions from religious extremists 
should be permissible.3 Some have argued that such speech should be prohibited in order 
to prevent responsive violence and terrorism.4 Recently, a school of journalism dean 
argued in USA Today that the publication of cartoons that insult the Prophet Muhammad 
                                                           
1 Daniel Ortner, J.D.  BYU Law ’15, Law Clerk to Judge Kent A. Jordan, Federal Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit. With thanks to Professor RonNell Andersen Jones, for her invaluable assistance with this 
article. 
2 See Josh Levs, Ed Payne & Michael Pearson, A Timeline of the Charlie Hebdo Terror Attack, CNN (Jan. 
9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/08/europe/charlie-hebdo-attack-timeline/. See also What Motivated 
the Attacks on Charlie Hebdo?, PBS NEWSHOUR EXTRA (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/daily_videos/what-motivated-the-attacks-on-charlie-hebdo/. 
3 A foiled attack in May 2015 on a Texas cartoon contest by two armed gunmen launched another wave of 
debate over the censorship of provocative images. See generally Scott Shane, Texas Attacker Left Trail of 
Extremist Ideas on Twitter, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/middleeast/isis-texas-muhammad-cartoons.html?_r=0. If 
attacks related to the publication of images of the Prophet Muhammad on U.S. soil become even more 
common, it is likely that calls to censor/calls for restriction will also intensify. An indication of such 
escalation in calls for restriction is the decision of PEN America to give a free speech award to Charlie 
Hebdo, which led to sharp criticism and illustrates the continuing intensity of this debate. See Alan Yuhas, 
Two Dozen Writers Join Charlie Hebdo PEN Award Protest, GUARDIAN, Apr. 29, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/apr/29/writers-join-protest-charlie-hebdo-pen-award; see also, 
e.g., Rich Lowry, Americans Have a Right to Insult Islam, NAT’L REV. (May 5, 2015, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/417903/americans-have-right-insult-islam-rich-lowry. 
4 See, e.g., Tomas Byrne, Banning Blasphemy: The Repercussions of Religious Offense Under the Right to 
Free Speech, TOMAS BYRNE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.tomasbyrne.com/blasphemy-may-offensive-laws-
no-place-tolerant-society/; see also Javier E. David, After Paris and Copenhagen, Can Free Speech Learn 
to Live with Religion?, CNBC (Feb. 21, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102439946. Garry 
Trudeau, the well-known creator of the Doonsbury cartoon series also declared that Charlie Hebdo 
“wandered into the realm of hate speech,” which is illegal in France because “it directly incites violence.” 
Garry Trudeau, The Abuse of Satire, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/the-abuse-of-satire/390312/. 
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“constitute fighting words, or a clear and present danger . . . .”5 Thus, attempts have been 
made to restrict speech that is seen as offensive to religion or religious sentiments.6  
This is not the first time that publication of media that is critical of Islam has 
sparked controversy.7 Several years ago, the publication of cartoons depicting the 
Prophet Muhammad in Danish Newspaper Jyllands-Posten led to massive worldwide 
protests, violent attacks, and a large number of casualties.8 More recently, the release of 
Innocence of Muslims,9 a trailer critical of the Prophet Muhammad, sparked riots and 
demonstrations in countless cities in Africa and the Middle East.10 The trailer may also 
have played some role in the infamous attacks on the U.S. compound in Benghazi, which 
resulted in the death of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens.11 As a response to protests and 
violence over the Innocence of Muslims video, senior Obama Administration Officials 
such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged YouTube to remove the videos in certain 
countries, which further sparked debate about the extent of freedom of speech and 
whether such cartoons should be permitted.12  
                                                           
5 DeWayne Wickham, Wickham: ‘Charlie Hebdo’ Crosses the Line, USA TODAY, Jan. 20, 2015, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/01/19/charlie-hebdo-cross-line-free-speech-covers-islam-
limits-wickham/21960957/. But see Eugene Volokh, Adherants of Islam, Second Largest Religion in the 
World, Are a “Powerless, Disenfranchised Minority”?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 11, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/11/adherents-of-islam-
second-largest-religion-in-the-world-are-a-powerless-disenfranchised-minority/ (“I would have thought that 
one of the most prominent and (at least in the distant past) iconoclastic cartoonists in the world, receiving 
an award for his lifetime achievement as a cartoonist, would have explained in a bit more detail just which 
sorts of ideologies should now be immunized from ridicule, and which sort of cartoons should indeed be 
criminalized or at least condemned by the cartooning elites.”); see also David Frum, Why Garry Trudeau Is 
Wrong About Charlie Hebdo, ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/why-garry-trudeau-is-wrong-about-charlie-
hebdo/390336/.   
6 For instance, Missouri enacted a law in 2012 that outlawed profane behavior near a house of worship, 
which was struck down by the Eighth Circuit. MO. REV. STAT. § 574.035; see also Eugene Volokh, Ban on 
Profane, Rude, or Indecent Speech That Disrupts Houses of Worship Violates the First Amendment, WASH. 
POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/03/09/ban-on-profane-rude-or-indecent-speech-that-disturbs-houses-of-worship-
violates-the-first-amendment/. See generally Elizabeth Crisp, SNAP Sues over Mo. ‘House of Worship 
Protection Act,’ ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Aug. 22, 2012, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/snap-sues-over-mo-house-of-worship-protection-act/article_1903f94c-eca5-11e1-8dca-
0019bb30f31a.html. 
7 More generally, the discussion about the potential for Internet speech to contribute to violence dates back 
to at least the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional 
Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 367 (1996). 
8 For extensive discussion of the Danish Muhammad Cartoon controversy, see infra Section I.A. 
9 Innocence of Muslims (Kaloula Basseley Nakoula 2012). 
10 For more on the Innocence of Muslims controversy, see infra Section I.B. 
11 See Kevin Drum, Yes, the “Innocence of Muslims” Video Really Did Play a Role in the Benghazi 
Attacks, MOTHER JONES (May 2, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/05/yes-
innocence-muslims-video-really-did-play-role-benghazi-attacks. See also Ambassador Killed in Benghazi 
Attack Considered Leaving Libya in April 2011, Emails Reveal, FOX NEWS (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/03/01/ambassador-killed-in-benghazi-attack-considered-leaving-
libya-in-april-2011-emails-reveal.html.  
12 See Dawn C. Chmielewski, ‘Innocence of Muslims’: Administration Asks YouTube to Review Video, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/13/entertainment/la-et-ct-administration-asks-
youtube-to-review-innocence-of-muslims-video-20120913. See generally Robert M. O'Neil, Hate Speech, 
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Reactions across the world to the publication of these cartoons have varied 
dramatically.13 These reactions are part of a long-standing global debate regarding 
the worth of speech that is offensive to religious sentiments.14 European nations and 
the U.N. have been heavily involved in efforts to encourage global bans on so-called 
hate speech,15 but the United States has soundly rejected such efforts and strongly 
defended its stance on freedom of speech.16 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Fighting Words, and Beyond—Why American Law Is Unique, 76 ALB. L. REV. 467, 490–98 (2013) 
(discussing international implications of U.S. speech law). 
13 For instance, after the attacks in France, Russia reiterated that the publication of the cartoons would 
violate laws banning materials offensive to religious sentiments: “Disseminating caricatures on religious 
themes in the media can be considered insulting or humiliating to the representatives of religious 
confessions and groups, and qualified as inciting ethnic and religious hatred.” Russia: Publishing Prophet 
Cartoons Illegal, LOCAL (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.thelocal.fr/20150116/russian-watchdog-publishing-
muhammad-cartoons-illegal. Protestors in Russia who demonstrated in solidarity with victims of the attacks 
in France were actually arrested or fined. See id. 
In stark contrast, French authorities arrested 54 people for hate speech including a well-known French 
comedian. See France Arrests 54 for ‘Defending Terrorism’ After Charlie Hebdo Attack, AL JAZEEERA 
AM. (Jan. 14, 2015, 8:17 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/14/france-
charliehebdoarrests.html.  
14 I have written critically of the willingness of the European Court of Human Rights to allow states to ban 
speech offensive to religious sentiments. See Daniel Ortner, Conscientious Offenders: Russia’s Ban on 
“Extremist” Religious Literature, and the European Court of Human Rights, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 147 (2016). 
See generally Bret Stephens, The Scandal of Free Speech, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bret-stephens-the-scandal-of-free-speech-1421106813 (arguing that the 
solidarity after the Charlie Hebdo attacks belies an increasingly prevalent global attitude against freedom 
of speech). For a particularly extreme version of this argument, see Tanya Cohen, Here Is Why It’s Time to 
Get Tough on Hate Speech in America, THOUGHT CATALOG (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://thoughtcatalog.com/tanya-cohen/2015/01/here-is-why-its-time-to-get-tough-on-hate-speech-in-
america/. 
15 See Fighting Deadly Hate Speech Requires ‘Multi-Layered Approach,’ UN Official Says, UN NEWS CTR. 
(Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44056#.VP9YOvnF-AU; David Stringer 
& Diaa Hadid, Muslim Leaders Say Call for Global Ban on Anti-Islam ‘Hate Speech’ Is Not Attack on Free 
Speech, NAT’L POST (Sept. 29, 2012, 4:26 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/09/29/muslim-leaders-
say-call-for-global-ban-on-anti-islam-hate-speech-is-not-attack-on-free-speech/; see also Eugene Volokh, 
Bosnian Serb Legislature Passes Ban on Offensive Speech Online, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/06/bosnian-serb-
legislature-passes-ban-on-offensive-speech-online/.  
16 As President Obama powerfully declared before the U.N. General Assembly: 
Americans have fought and died around the globe to protect the right of all people to express their 
views, even views that we profoundly disagree with. We do not do so because we support hateful 
speech, but because our founders understood that without such protections, the capacity of each 
individual to express their own views and practice their own faith may be threatened. We do so 
because in a diverse society, efforts to restrict speech can quickly become a tool to silence critics 
and oppress minorities.  
We do so because given the power of faith in our lives, and the passion that religious differences 
can inflame, the strongest weapon against hateful speech is not repression; it is more speech—the 
voices of tolerance that rally against bigotry and blasphemy, and lift up the values of 
understanding and mutual respect.  
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-president-un-general-assembly.  
On the other hand, the President also declared: “The future must not belong to those who slander the 
prophet of Islam. But to be credible, those who condemn that slander must also condemn the hate we see in 
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At first glance, the claim that speech can be proscribed not because it is 
offensive, but because it will engender a violent reaction and harm national security 
seems more moderate and restrained than an all-out call for hate-speech laws. Yet, 
ultimately these approaches are two sides of the same coin. Allowing speech to be 
restricted would allow those offended to shut down speech with which they disagree 
through the threat of violence, even though the topics of discussion are some of the 
most pertinent and urgently needed.17 
This Article analyzes why the American government should not be able to 
proscribe the publication or republication of media, even when there is reason to believe 
that the publication could potentially lead to violence and civic reprisals against soldiers, 
diplomats, or citizens. The Article considers the various exemptions to the First 
Amendment that allow for the government to regulate or restrict certain types of 
unprotected speech. While there are many similarities between justifications for these 
limited-speech doctrines and for those preventing provocative speech, such as images of 
Muhammad, the differences between these groups of thought are even more significant.18 
These differences highlight why it would be unwise to allow the restriction of such 
provocative speech.19 A significant example of this contrast is that unprotected, or 
prohibited, speech is treated as outside the realm of protected speech because it has an 
intrinsic lack of value.20 Punishing provocative, but otherwise fully protected speech, 
solely because of the reaction it engenders, however, imposes speech restrictions purely 
for extrinsic reasons rather than in response to the value of the speech itself.21 It is a 
terrorist’s veto to allow those opposed to an idea the ability to suppress its expression 
through threats of violence.22 Such a veto would violate the core First Amendment 
principle that “constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the images of Jesus Christ that are desecrated, or churches that are destroyed, or the Holocaust that is 
denied.” Id. 
As Professor Turley noted, “President Obama's U.N. address last month declaring America's support 
for free speech, while laudable, seemed confused—even at odds with his administration's efforts.” Jonathan 
Turley, Shut Up and Play Nice: How the Western World Is Limiting Free Speech, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/shut-up-and-play-nice-how-the-western-world-is-limiting-
free-speech/2012/10/12/e0573bd4-116d-11e2-a16b-2c110031514a_story.html. 
17 See Ross Douthat, The Blasphemy We Need, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015, 4:00 PM), 
http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/the-blasphemy-we-need/; see also Johnathan Chait, Charlie 
Hebdo and the Right to Commit Blasphemy, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 7, 2015, 1:20 PM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/charlie-hebdo-and-the-right-to-commit-blasphemy.html.  
18 See infra Parts II, III. 
19 See infra Parts II, III. 
20 See infra Parts II, III. 
21 See infra Parts II, III. 
22 See infra Part IV. The phrase “terrorist’s veto” has been used in the popular press and on blogs in 
reference to the backlash triggered as a result of the publication of provocative images but has thus far 
received little attention in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, The Terrorist’s Veto, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/02/the-terrorist-
veto.html; Michael J. Totten, The Terrorist’s Veto, CITY J. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.city-
journal.org/2012/eon0920mt.html. Professor Logan briefly mentioned the phrase in a footnote in a very 
different context. See Wayne A. Logan, Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 
721, 755 n.233 (2008) (speaking of the potential that terrorists sentenced to death would become martyrs).   
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assertion or exercise.”23 Just as appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the heckler’s 
veto,24 a terrorist’s veto is impermissible under the First Amendment.25 
Part I contrasts three recent controversies over the publication of images of the 
Prophet Muhammad to illustrate the complex and varied relationship between the 
publication of provocative images and actual acts of violence.26 Part II considers prior 
restraints regarding certain types of speech, and argues that they are especially 
inappropriate for provocative material.27 Part III examines a variety of unprotected 
speech, including fighting words, incitement, true threats, and material support for 
terrorism, in order to illustrate why provocative speech is fully protected speech and any 
efforts to restrict it would fail strict scrutiny.28 Part IV elaborates on the concept of a 
terrorist’s veto, and why creating such a veto would be harmful to the marketplace of 
ideas.29  
 
I. THREE CARTOON CONTROVERSIES AND RECURRING THEMES 
             
This Part focuses on three recent instances where the publication of provocative 
images of the Prophet Muhammad led to outbreaks of violence: the Danish Cartoon 
Controversy, the Innocence of Muslims video, and the Charlie Hebdo cartoons. These 
three controversies have considerable similarities, but also diverge in meaningful ways. 
Some of the most notable differences include: the intentions of those publishing the 
cartoons, the spontaneity of acts of violence, who was targeted for violence, the amount 
of time it took for violence to occur, the degree to which non-violent means proceeded 
violence, and public reactions to the images. Following the description of the three 
incidents in Sections A-C, Section D highlights some of their similarities and differences, 
illustrating themes that will remain relevant throughout the Article. 
Of the three controversies, the Danish Cartoon controversy was the earliest. The 
passage of time has allowed for more extensive analysis, which has revealed complexities 
that were not immediately apparent at first sight. In particular, Professor Jytte Klausen 
has published what is likely the definitive account26 of the cartoon controversy in the 
                                                           
23 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 
(1963)). 
24 Professor Harry Kalven is commonly recognized as originating the term “heckler’s veto” in HARRY 
KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–45 (1965), although it now sees common 
usage. See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias 
Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 710 & n.141 (1993). See also Forsyth 
Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 140–42 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (speaking of the 
heckler’s veto generally). 
Recently, the Sixth Circuit upheld the right of anti-Muslim evangelical speakers to speak even in light 
of a hostile and threatening Muslim crowd. The Court concluded that the removal of protesters by police 
constituted an impermissible heckler’s veto. And it “reaffirm[ed] the comprehensive boundaries of the First 
Amendment’s free speech protection, which envelopes all manner of speech, even when that speech is 
loathsome in its intolerance, designed to cause offense, and, as a result of such offense, arouses violent 
retaliation.” Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 234 (6th Cir. 2015). 
25 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 140–42 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(speaking of the heckler’s veto generally).  
26 See Oliver Kamm, Danish Cartoons: The Tyranny of Moderation, PROSPECT MAG. (Dec. 19, 2019), 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/arts-and-books/the-tyranny-of-moderation (“Jytte Klausen, a Danish 
academic in the US, has written what must rank as the definitive account.”); Steven Poole, Steven Poole’s 
Non-Fiction Roundup, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2009, 7:06 PM) (referring to Klausen’s book as “what 
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English language.27 Her first-hand research, including interviews on and off the record 
with key participants, revealed critical and otherwise unavailable information regarding 
the roots of the controversy and those who attempted to inflame public sentiment 
regarding the cartoons.  
The Innocence of Muslims video and the murder of the editors of French satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo are still quite recent and a full account of what exactly 
provoked the reactions against these images still remains to be written, but this Article 
attempts to paint a thorough picture by relying on newspaper articles and other sources.   
 
A.  Danish Cartoon Controversy 
 
On September 30, 2005, Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons that were the 
result of a solicitation for drawings depicting the Prophet Muhammad from the 
Denmark’s newspaper illustrators.28 In response to a rumor that illustrators had refused to 
draw such depictions for a Danish children’s book on the Prophet Muhammad, the 
newspaper hoped to test how many artists would be willing to submit a drawing.29 Of the 
forty-two illustrators solicited, only twelve submitted drawings.30 The newspaper had 
promised that all the drawings submitted would be published “as a demonstration against 
intimidation and self-censorship.”31 The cartoons were published alongside an essay by 
the newspaper’s culture and book review Editor, Flemming Rose, which emphasized that 
the cartoons were being published in opposition to both self-censorship and greater 
political correctness.32 Carsten Juste, the newspaper’s editor in chief, later stressed that if 
he had been aware of the extent of the backlash to the cartoons, he never would have 
allowed them to be published.33  
The cartoons themselves varied in content and in level of offensiveness to Islamic 
sentiments.34 Some were actually critical of the newspaper’s solicitation rather than of 
Islam itself.35 Some did not feature Muhammad at all, or were criticisms of Islamic 
                                                                                                                                                                              
deserves to become the definitive account of the Danish cartoon controversy of 2005-6 . . . .”); see also 
Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World, Yale University Press, 2009, 
http://yalebooks.com/book/9780300124729/cartoons-shook-world (demonstrating more reactions to the 
cartoons).  
27 Ironically, Klausen’s book itself was the subject of considerable controversy when Yale University Press 
refused to publish the cartoons in her book. See David Gura, Show and Tell, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 
(Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.cjr.org/critical_eye/show_and_tell.php?page=all (book review). The failure to 
include the images has harmed the reputation of the book in the eyes of the general public. Every single 
review of the book on Amazon is critical of the decision, including seven one-star reviews, all of which are 
based solely on the failure to publish the cartoons themselves. See Customer Reviews: The Cartoons that 
Shook the World, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/The-Cartoons-That-Shook-World/product-
reviews/0300124724/ref=dp_db_cm_cr_acr_txt?ie=UTF8 (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
28 See JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD 13–14 (2009).  
29 Id. at 14. 
30 Id. at 14–15. 
31 Id. at 14. 
32 Id. at 13, 15. 
33 See id. at 19.  
34 See id. at 20. 
35 See id. at 20–21. 
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fundamentalists who use Islam to justify atrocities.36 The most iconic of the images was 
drawn by cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, who depicted “the Prophet with a bomb in his 
turban.”37  Westergaard stated that he intended his drawing to show how radical Muslims 
distort the message of Muhammad rather than to attack the Islamic faith.38 Another one 
of the cartoonists emphasized that he simply sought to subject Islam to the same kind of 
criticism to which he had subjected other figures, saying, “I have teased the Pope and 
Bush, so I thought I could tease Muslims, too.”39  
The initial reaction to the publication of the cartoons was tepid, with a variety of 
local Danish newspapers leveling criticism at Jyllands-Posten for bashing Muslims.40 
The publication of the cartoons was also seen in Denmark as an extension of a local 
debate over the influence of a few radical mullahs who had been subject to extensive 
criticism by the newspaper.41 This local context was lost once the cartoons spread. 
Ironically, these same Danish mullahs played an extremely active role in provoking 
international criticism of the cartoons, while at the same time relying on their right to 
freedom of speech to defend making controversial sermons.42  
Within a couple of weeks of the publication of the cartoons, an international 
backlash began against the cartoons and against Denmark. The cartoons had fit perfectly 
into an existing narrative building in several Muslim countries that Denmark had allowed 
for the expression of speech which was hateful to Islam.43 In early October, eleven 
ambassadors of Muslim countries sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Denmark 
regarding the cartoons, as well as other incidents that were viewed as part of an “on-
going smearing campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam and 
Muslims.”44 When the Danish Government did not respond, resolutions against the 
cartoons were passed and a boycott movement started.45 At first, the efforts were all non-
violent: peaceful protests occurred in Copenhagen,46 letters to the editor were penned, 
and community groups organized to raise awareness of anti-Islamic sentiment.47 Indeed, 
these peaceful protests were successful in ultimately leading to an apology by the Danish 
                                                           
36 At least two of the cartoons mocked the contest as a publicity stunt or reactionary. Another used imagery 
critical of Islam but did not feature an image of the Prophet. And at least one was an illustration of 
Muhammad but not critical at all. See Martin Asser, What the Muhammad Cartoons Portray, BBC NEWS, 
(January 2, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4693292.stm. 
37 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 21–22. 
38 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 22 (arguing that this understanding would have been clear to Danish 
readers who would see the cartoon in light of the existing norm of anticlerical sentiment, but that it would 
have been foreign to an international audience).  
39 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 25. 
40 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 17. 
41 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 27–29. 
42 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 27–28. Likewise, given the newspaper’s strong defense of freedom of 
expression it is ironic that the newspaper later attempted to use lawsuits to silence critics of its decision to 
publish the cartoons. See generally id. at 34 (discussing the newspaper’s two attempts “to use legal means 
to stop critics”). 
43 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28  at 35.  
44 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 36.  
45 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 35, 37. 
46 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 83.  
47 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 43. Those protesting also raised legitimate concerns, such as the fact that 
Denmark has a law against Holocaust denial, but not one protecting against anti-Islamic speech. See id. at 
88. 
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Prime Minister,48 as well as from the editor in chief of Jyllands-Posten.49 Nevertheless, 
even in the early nonviolent phases of the controversy, there were death threats against 
the newspaper employees and several of the cartoonists.50 
Yet, there were individuals who sought to benefit from igniting even larger 
protests. Klausen concludes that the increasing radicalization of protests was the result of 
a “deliberate, albeit uncoordinated, escalation.”51 In particular, certain Danish imams 
sough to capitalize on the cartoons.52 They visited Cairo and Beirut with a dossier of anti-
Islamic cartoons, some of which were far more inflammatory than the Jyllands-Posten 
cartoons.53 This collection of cartoons helped to spur outrage on the part of more radical 
actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and even years later Middle Eastern leaders did 
not know which cartoons had actually been published in the Danish newspaper.54 The 
imams also appeared on Arab-language television stations sharply criticizing the 
cartoons.55 As a result, in early 2006 the protests began turning violent.56 In February, 
influential Muslim Brotherhood leader al-Qaradawi “delivered a fiery sermon” calling for 
a “day of rage,” which spurred on violence.57 The scale and destructive potential of 
protests increased: in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s leader provoked a crowd of 500,000 
individuals gathered for the commemoration of the Shiite holiday Ashura into opposition 
to the cartoons.58 At its peak, the protestors destroyed embassies and killed scores of 
individuals.59 In one day of protesting in Nigeria alone, forty-five people were killed and 
185 were injured as a result of the protests.60  
The protests evolved far beyond opposition to the particular cartoons. For example, 
American businesses were targeted even though the U.S. government had publically 
condemned the cartoons.61 Al Queda also co-opted the cartoons as part of its anti-
Western message.62 Likewise, local Islamic leaders continued to encourage protests, 
many motivated not by opposition to the cartoons, but by a desire to galvanize popular 
anger against local governments.63 
The aims of the protesters varied markedly. It is likely that some had never even 
seen the cartoons.64 Some drew distinctions between cartoons that depicted Muhammad 
positively and those that depicted him negatively, while others sought to prohibit all 
                                                           
48 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 41. Muslims leaders accepted what they interpreted to be the Prime 
Minister’s apology, even though he denied that it was in fact an apology. 
49 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 32.  
50 See Paul Belien, Jihad Against Danish Newspaper, BRUSSELS J. (Oct. 22, 2005), 
http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/382. 
51 KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 39. 
52 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 39. 
53 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 88–91.  
54 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 101. 
55 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 102. 
56 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 83.  
57 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 103, 106.  
58 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 40. 
59 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 108. 
60 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 108. 
61 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 41. 
62 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 45. 
63 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 113. 
64 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 126. 
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efforts to depict the Prophet and criticized even pro-Islamic depictions.65 Other protesters 
focused more on the perceived lack of an apology than on the cartoons themselves.66 
Some Muslims instead spoke out against the protests and the violence, encouraging 
peaceful and polite protest instead.67 The publication of the cartoons also sparked 
extensive discussion in the media and elsewhere as to the propriety in general of 
published images likely to be highly offensive.68 While many European newspapers 
republished the cartoons in solidarity, many others criticized the cartoons and refused to 
republish them.69 In the United States, in particular, few newspapers decided to reprint 
the controversial cartoons.70 International republication, despite its rarity, played a critical 
role in escalating the conflict.71 
Klausen argues that even though almost none of those protesting in Islamic 
countries had first heard about the cartoons from the internet,72 the internet and new 
media was “a causal factor” in the explosion of the controversy.73 Those opposing the 
cartoons used the internet and mobile technology to share the images and galvanize 
protests.74 The mobs themselves were often summoned by anonymous text messages and 
mobile phone calls.75 
Looking at this history of the Danish cartoons, it is clear that events escalated as a 
result of efforts on the part of extremist groups to provoke backlash. While the initial 
reaction was a thoughtful debate and non-violent protest, individuals co-opted the 
protests and turned them into an opportunity for personal or political gain. Years after 
their publication, “[t]he cartoons became a standard reference for real and perceived 
conflict over what you ‘can say’ about Muslims.”76 Remarks about Islam that took place 
even after the cartoon controversy had died down, such as Pope Benedict’s remarks that 
Islam is “a faith spread by the sword,” were “linked to the cartoons by both the European 
media and . . . Muslims.”77  As such, the cartoons became a weapon wielded by Muslims 
to attack speech critical of their faith, regardless of how offensive or provocative those 
criticisms were intended to be. Later, self-censorship regarding the publication of images 
of the Prophet Muhammad continued to be rampant, an example of which was Comedy 
Central’s decision to censor an episode of the provocative comedy show South Park that 
depicted Muhammad.78 Indeed, Comedy Central went so far as to bleep out even usage of 
                                                           
65 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 132–33. 
66 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 106. 
67 KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 95, 106. 
68 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 51–52. 
69 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 51. 
70 Klausen estimates that only twenty-five U.S. newspapers republished the cartoons, and that most of them 
were student papers. See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 9. 
71 KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 47. 
72 See generally KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 115 tbl.3. 
73 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 5.  
74 See Jytte Klausen, Egypt Fans the Flames, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 13, 2012), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2012-09-13/egypt-fans-flames (discussing Innocence of 
Muslims reactions in light of the Danish Cartoon controversy). 
75 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 109. 
76 KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 56. 
77 KLAUSEN, supra note 28; see also Jeff Israely, The Pope Tackles Faith and Terrorism, TIME (Sept. 13, 
2006), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1534640,00.html. 
78 See generally Dave Itzkoff, ‘South Park’ Episode Altered After Muslim Group’s Warning, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/arts/television/23park.html. 
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the name “Muhammad” in order to avoid provoking a violent backlash.79 This censorship 
was in place even though the show had included a depiction of Muhammad in 2001 
without incident.80 Thus, radical groups stoked the flames of controversy and used violent 
responses to impose censorship.  
 
B.  Innocence of Muslims 
 
The origins of the Innocence of Muslims video are still shrouded in some mystery. 
It was likely written by filmmaker Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, a Coptic Christian 
strongly opposed to Islam, in consultation with other individuals who are strongly anti-
Islam.81 Those cast for the film were told that the movie was to be an epic about a tribal 
leader.82 The filmmaker later dubbed in dialogue that references Muhammad.83 The 
fourteen-minute trailer, which was posted on YouTube and spread across the globe, 
depicts a highly critical and questionable account of the origin of Islam.84 An example of 
this is the trailer’s portrayal of Muhammad as a murderer and pedophile.85 
Unlike the Danish cartoonists who sought to spark a dialogue about freedom of 
speech, Nakoula seems to have attempted to be especially provocative through the release 
of the film; for instance, he used the pseudonym Sam Bacile,86 and claimed to be an 
                                                           
79 See id. 
80 See South Park Creators Warned Over Muhammad Depiction, BBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/8636455.stm; See also Todd Leopold, Has ‘South Park’ gone too 
far this time?, CNN (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/SHOWBIZ/TV/04/21/south.park.religion/.  
81 See Adrian Chen, Here Is the Original Script for Innocence of Muslims, GAWKER (Sept. 18, 2012, 5:45 
PM), http://gawker.com/5944290/here-is-the-original-script-for-innocence-of-muslims. 
82 See Olga Khazan, ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Movie Disavowed by Its Actors, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2012),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/innocence-of-muslims-cast-disavows-
movie/2012/09/13/5c4d0a52-fdaf-11e1-a31e-804fccb658f9_blog.html; See also Chen, supra note 81. 
83 Chen, supra note 81.  
84 See Chen, supra note 81. 
85 See Michael Joseph Gross, Disaster Movie, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/12/making-of-innocence-of-muslims. 
86 The filmmaker, Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, was arrested after the release of the film for violating the 
terms of his parole due to his use of a pseudonym in the publication of the film. Critics of his arrest implied 
that he was arrested due to public opposition to the content of the film. Brooks Barnes, Man Behind Anti-
Islam Video Gets Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/maker-
of-anti-islam-video-gets-prison-term.html; Jessica Garrison & Victoria Kim, ‘Innocence of Muslims’ 
Filmmaker Arrested on Probation Violation, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012, 3:36 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/09/innocence-of-muslims-filmmaker-arrested-on-probation-
violation.html; Charles C. Johnson, Imprisoned ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Producer Nakoula Nakoula: ‘I 
Want the World to See the Truth,’ DAILY CALLER (Aug. 5, 2013, 10:14 PM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2013/08/05/imprisoned-innocence-of-muslims-producer-nakoula-nakoula-i-want-the-
world-to-see-the-truth/. See also Stan Wilson, Producer of Anti-Islam Film Arrested, Ordered Held Without 
Bail, CNN (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/27/world/california-anti-islam-filmmaker/ 
(“Dugdale pointed to a probation report citing eight allegations in which Nakoula had allegedly violated his 
probation. One of those was a requirement not to use aliases without permission from his probation 
office.”). 
More recently, the political motivation behind Nakoula’s arrest returned to the spotlight, when the 
father of one the victims of the attack on the embassy in Benghazi reported that shortly after the attacks he 
was told by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that she would have the filmmaker arrested as a result 
of the attacks. See J. Taylor Rushing, Benghazi Victim’s Father: Hillary Told Me Maker of Film About 
Prophet Muhammad Would Be Arrested ‘for Causing my Son’s Death,’ DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 24, 
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Israeli Jew, likely in order to further stoke outrage.87 Nakoula also claimed that “he had 
raised $5 million from . . . Jewish donors to make [the film].”88 He has declared that, 
“Islam is a cancer, period,” and stated that he acted in order to denounce Islam.89 The 
filmmaker made it clear that he “has no regrets,” and promised that he would continue to 
produce films and books critical of Islam.90 
The trailer was posted on YouTube in July 2012 but did not attract attention until 
an Arabic-language version also appeared on YouTube several months later.91 Coptic 
Christian activists promoted the video, seeking to draw attention to the film.92 On 
September 8, 2012, a Muslim television program in Egypt aired the video, after which the 
trailer began to spread rapidly in the region.93 The video “led to protests across the 
globe,” including in Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen.94 It is likely that the film also played some role, albeit a 
contested one, in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi in 2012.95 Just as with the 
Danish cartoons, some of the protests may have been instigated by political groups, like 
the Muslim Brotherhood.96  It is estimated that twenty-eight people were killed as a result 
of the violence involved in the protests against the film.97 Cast members and others 
involved in the film also received death threats, and one Egyptian cleric issued a fatwa 
calling for the death of everyone involved in the film.98 To date, however, there has been 
no noted violence against anyone involved in the making of the film.99 
                                                                                                                                                                              
2015, 6:30 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3287090/Benghazi-victim-s-father-Hillary-told-
maker-film-prophet-Mohamed-arrested-causing-son-s-death.html.  
87 See Emily Chertoff, Real-Life ‘Law and Order’ Move: ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Filmmaker Arrested for 
Violating Probation, ATLANTIC (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/-
real-life-law-and-order-move-innocence-of-muslims-filmmaker-arrested-for-violating-probation/263017/. 
Seth Barrett Tillman, Lecturer, Maynooth University Department of Law, has suggested that Nakoula 
knowingly risked Islamists’ violence against Jews and Israelis and strife between Jews and Muslims in 
order to shield his own identity and to deflect violence against himself, his family, and his co-religionists. 
E-mail from Seth Barrett Tillman, Lecturer, Maynooth Univ., to author (Apr. 19, 2015, 06:10 EST) (on file 
with author). Although Nakoula clearly was deliberately provocative, there is no indication that he 
specifically hoped that Jews would be targeted as a result of his actions. It seems likely that his pseudonym 
was a way to hide his parole violations; whether it was intended to do more is less clear. Even though there 
is a lack of evidence of his intending to stoke violence, the implications of this possibility are discussed 
further in infra note 325. 
88 Jens Erik Gould, How Innocence of Muslims Emerged from the Seamy Side of Hollywood, TIME (Sept. 
15, 2012), http://nation.time.com/2012/09/15/how-innocence-of-muslims-emerged-from-the-seamy-side-
of-hollywood/. 
89 Gross, supra note 85. 
90 Serge F. Kovaleski & Brooks Barnes, From Man Who Insulted Muhammad, No Regret, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/us/from-the-man-who-insulted-islam-no-retreat.html.  
91 See Gross, supra note 85.  
92 See Gross, supra note 85. 
93 See Gross, supra note 85. 
94 Kovaleski, supra note 90. 
95 See Drum, supra note 11; see also David D. Kirkpatrick, A Deadly Mix in Benghazi, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0. 
96 See Michael Weiss, Guilt and the ‘Innocence of Muslims,’ WORLD AFF. J., 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/guilt-and-innocence-muslims (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
97 See id. 
98 See Adi Robertson, YouTube Must Take Down Explosive ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Video in Copyright 
Suit, VERGE (Feb. 26, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/26/5449826/google-youtube-
must-remove-innocence-of-muslims-video-in-copyright-suit; Phil Willon & Robert Faturechi, ‘Innocence 
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The film was widely and almost universally condemned. President Obama, for one, 
officially spoke out against and condemned the film.100 The United States also issued a 
heavily apologetic television advertisement that aired in Pakistan, featuring President 
Obama and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.101 White House administration 
officials also urged YouTube to check whether the film was in violation of the site’s 
terms of service.102 Ultimately, the film was removed from YouTube, although not as a 
result of its provocative content; the Ninth Circuit ordered the video to be taken down as 
a result of a copyright claim by one of the actresses who claimed she had been deceived 
into participating in the film.103  
 
C. Charlie Hebdo 
       
Charlie Hebdo is a highly irreverent French satirical magazine. It has been the 
target of Islamic fundamentalism for years as a result of repeatedly printing cartoons of 
Muhammad and other images critical of Islam.104 Yet, in contrast with Jylland-Posten, 
which was labeled hypocritical by some for not publishing cartoons critical of 
Christianity, Charlie Hebdo has published a wide variety of blasphemous and 
sacrilegious content.105 Charlie Hebdo initially became enmeshed in the Muhammad 
cartoon controversy after it published an issue in 2006 with an image of Muhammad 
weeping over religious fundamentalism and reprinted the Jyllands-Posten cartoons.106 It 
                                                                                                                                                                              
of Muslims’ Associates Get Death Threats, Consultant Says, L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW (Sept. 15, 2012, 9:22 
AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/09/innocence-of-muslim-allies-fearful-after-threats-
consultant-says.html. 
99 One of the actresses had to move and shut down her business in light of threats, but there is no indication 
that any of the threats of violence came to fruition. See Nancy Dillon, Cindy Lee Garcia, Actress in 
‘Innocence of Muslims,’ Is Ecstatic Court Has Ordered YouTube to Take Islam Mocking Video Down, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/actress-ecstatic-muslim-
mocking-video-youtube-article-1.1704410. 
100 Toby Harnden, Obama Tells United Nations It Is ‘Time to Heed the Words of Gandhi,’ Condemns 
‘Disgusting’ Anti-Islam Video and Insists ‘Muslims Have Suffered the Most at the Hands of Extremism,’ 
DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2208396/Obama-
condemns-disgusting-anti-Islam-video-insists-Muslims-suffered-hands-extremism.html. 
101 See Shareen Pathak & Ken Wheaton, See the Spot: U.S. Runs Ad in Pakistan Denouncing Anti-Islam 
Video, ADVERT. AGE (Sept. 20, 2012), http://adage.com/article/media/u-s-runs-ad-pakistan-denouncing-
innocence-muslims/237344/. 
102 Dawn C. Chmielewski, YouTube’s Role at Issue over Video That Incited Mideast Violence, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/13/business/la-fi-ct-youtube-accountability-20120914. 
103 See Robertson, supra note 98. 
104 See Abby Phillip & Abby Ohlheiser, What Is Charlie Hebdo, the Provocative Satirical Newspaper 
Attacked by Gunmen in Paris?, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2015/01/07/what-is-charlie-hebdo-the-provocative-
satirical-magazine-attacked-by-gunmen-in-paris/. 
105 See Jason Karaian & Gideon Lichfield, Charlie Hebdo Has Had More Legal Run-Ins with Christians 
Than with Muslims, QUARTZ (Jan. 7, 2015), http://qz.com/322550/charlie-hebdo-has-had-more-legal-run-
ins-with-christians-than-with-muslims/. See also Gwladys Fouché, Danish Paper Rejected Jesus Cartoons, 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2006/feb/06/pressandpublishing.politics. 
106 Miriam Krule, Charlie Hebdo’s Most Controversial Religious Covers, Explained, SLATE: BROW BEAT 
(Jan. 7, 2015, 1:23 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2015/01/07/charlie_hebdo_covers_religious_satire_cartoons_translat
ed_and_explained.html. 
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was also firebombed in 2011.107 But the most direct trigger for the violent rampage was a 
2012 issue that featured a picture of the Prophet Muhammad lying naked in a 
pornographic pose.108 
On January 7, 2015, two masked gunmen burst into the office of Charlie Hebdo 
and killed editors and other employees of the magazine during a staff meeting.109 The 
gunmen also murdered a caretaker and a police officer, among others.110 At first, the 
shooters evaded the police, killing another police officer the following day, but they were 
ultimately shot after a siege.111 Additionally, there was a related attack on a kosher 
grocery store, which was carried out by a friend of the initial attackers.112 
Al Qaeda in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack on the Charlie Hebdo 
office.113 The attack was long-planned and professionally executed.114 Unlike the Danish 
Cartoons or Innocence of Muslims, there were no spontaneous protests, attacks on 
embassies, or other targets overseas as initial responses to the cartoons. Likewise, there 
were no demands that France apologize, or an effort to hold the nation accountable. For 
three years after the publication of the offending cartoon there seemed to be little reaction 
until the brutal murders.  
In response to the attacks there was a large groundswell of solidarity: 3.7 million 
people marched in France in criticism of the attacks.115 However, after the magazine 
published another issue featuring cartoons of Muhammad in defiance of the massacre, a 
large wave of violence began, strongly resembling the Jyllands-Posten protests, with 
individuals killed and homes vandalized.116 Some of the protests had a strong anti-French 
                                                           
107 See id. 
108 See id. This issue was notably condemned by the White House, which questioned “the judgment of 
publishing something like this,” according to then-Press Secretary Jay Carney. See Erik Wemple, On CNN, 
Jay Carney Stick to Position that Charlie Hebdo Should Have Pulled Back, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/01/08/on-cnn-jay-carney-sticks-to-position-
that-charlie-hebdo-should-have-pulled-back/. See also Catherine Taibi, These Are The Charlie Hebdo 
Cartoons That Terrorists Thought Were Worth Killing Over, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/07/charlie-hebdo-cartoons-paris-french-newspaper-
shooting_n_6429552.html. 
109 Charlie Hebdo Attack: Three Days of Terror, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14. 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. 
112 See Kim Sengupta, Charlie Hebdo Attacks Background: A Network of Dissidents Stretches from Algeria 
to Finsbury Park, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/charlie-
hebdo-attacks-a-network-of-dissidents-stretches-from-algeria-to-finsbury-park-9969253.html. 
113 Id. 
114 See Catherine E. Shoichet & Josh Levs, Al Qaeda Branch Claims Charlie Hebdo Attack Was Years in 
the Making, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/europe/charlie-hebdo-france-attacks/. 
115 The phrase “Je Suis Charlie” became ubiquitous after the attacks as a symbol of unity. See Ashley Fantz, 
Array of World Leaders Joins 3.7 Million in France to Defy Terrorism, CNN (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/11/world/charlie-hebdo-paris-march/. 
116 See Joseph Goldstein & Jawad Sukhanyar, Shots Fired at Kabul Protest Against French Newspaper, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/asia/shots-fired-during-protest-
against-charlie-hebdo-in-kabul.html; Josh Levs, 10 Killed, Churches Torches in Protests over Charlie 
Hebdo, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/20/world/charlie-hebdo-violence/.  
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theme.117 There were also non-violent protests in several countries, including Russia, 
Mali, Somalia, and Lebanon.118 
In July 2015, Laurent Sourisseau, the editor of Charlie Hebdo, declared that the 
magazine would no longer feature images of the Prophet Muhammad.119 He emphasized 
that the magazine had drawn the cartoons “to defend the principle that one can draw 
whatever they want,” and that, "[w]e've done our job. We have defended the right to 
caricature."120 The cartoonist who drew the images had also previously declared that he 
would no longer draw images of the Muhammad.121 Thus, even though the editor 
suggested that other cartoonists had taken up the mantle of drawing the similar images,122 
the attacks were successful in silencing at least one of the most visible sources of 
controversial content.  
 
D. Commonalities and Points of Diversion 
 
The similarities and differences between the controversies are illustrated in the 
following table:   
 
 Danish Cartoons 




Anti-Islamic Intent No123 Yes124 No125 
Time Between Initial 
Publication and First 
Acts of Violence 
3 Months126 3 Months127 
3 Years for the initial 
attack; less than a month 
for attacks following the 
second publication, 
which was a response to 
the initial attacks128 
Spontaneous Protests Yes129 Yes130 




                                                           
117 See Max Colchester & Drew Hinshaw, Anti-French Protests in Niger Kill 10 as Rallies Hit Africa, 
Middle East, Asia, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/anti-french-protests-in-niger-
kill-5-as-rallies-hit-africa-middle-east-asia-1421531073. 
118 See Levs, supra note 116. 
119 See Raziye Akkoc, There Will Be No More Prophet Mohammed Cartoons, Says Charlie Hebdo Editor, 
TELEGRAPH (July 17, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11747854/There-
will-be-no-more-Prophet-Mohammed-cartoons-says-Charlie-Hebdo-editor.html. 
120 Id. 
121 See Top Charlie Hebdo Cartoonist Luz Says Will No Longer Draw Mohammad, YAHOO NEWS (Apr. 29, 
2015), http://news.yahoo.com/top-charlie-hebdo-cartoonist-luz-says-no-longer-155059897.html.  
122 See Charlie Hebdo Editor: No More Mohammed Cartoons, BRIETBART LONDON (July 17, 2015), 
http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/07/17/charlie-hebdo-editor-no-more-mohammed-cartoons/. 
123 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.   
126 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra notes 46–58 and accompanying text.  
130 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
131 See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text. 
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 Danish Cartoons 




Coordinated Protests Yes132 Yes133 




Yes135 Yes136 Yes137 
Violence Against 
Creators 
No No Yes138 
Non-Violent Protests Yes139 No 
Yes, after the second 
publication140 
Boycotts and Other 
Political Action 
Yes141 No No 
Attacks Against 
Country of Origin 
No142 Yes143 Yes144 
Anti-Americanism Yes145 Yes146 No 
Reactions to the 
Cartoons 




Initial criticism, but 
large amounts of 
solidarity after the 
attacks149 
Apology by the State of 
Publication 
Reluctantly150 Yes151 No 
 
The facts from these situations help to illustrate some initial themes that will recur 
throughout the subsequent parts of the Article. The intent of the speaker, for example, is a 
factor that will recur frequently in the legal analysis that follows, particularly in Parts III 
and IV.152 The intent of those producing the images, however, varied dramatically. With 
Jyllands-Posten, the initial purpose of the cartoons was to stir up a conversation about 
Islamic images, and the magazine published cartoons both favorable to and critical of 
                                                           
132 See supra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
136 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
138 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
139 See supra notes 46 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text. 
142 Arguably, the murder of two in Copenhagen in February 2015 was at least somewhat related to the 
Jyllands-Posten cartoons. See Andrew Higgins & Melissa Eddy, Terror Attacks by a Native Son Rock 
Denmark, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/world/europe/copenhagen-
attacks-suspect-is-killed-police-say.html. 
143 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
145 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
146 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.  
152 See infra Section III.A.iii. and Part IV. 
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Islam.153 The Innocence of Muslims video maker had an overtly anti-Islamic agenda and 
saw his film as an attack against Islam.154 Charlie Hebdo sought to assert its willingness 
to defy a history of violent acts against the magazine.155 Regardless of the intent of the 
initial speaker, or the degree to which the images were intended to offend, the reactions 
were all substantially similar.   
The attacks raise questions about the closeness of the connection between 
publication of offensive material and violent responses, which is a critical legal factor 
discussed extensively in Parts II and III. Timing is one element that varied dramatically 
between the incidents. It took about three months for acts of violence to occur after both 
Jyllands-Posten156 and Innocence of Muslims,157 but with the Charlie Hebdo attack, it 
took almost three years.158  
Similarly, though, in each of the three controversies, planned and organized terror 
attacks mixed with spontaneous demonstrations in a deadly way. In response to the 
Danish cartoons, a non-violent movement was slowly escalated by violent extremists.159 
In the backlash to both the Danish cartoons160 and the Innocence of Muslims, there were 
seemingly spontaneous acts that were actually organized by professional organizations, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood.161 In contrast, after the Charlie Hebdo publication, an 
organized terror attack preceded any spontaneous protests or violence.162 The role of 
professional provocateurs, and whether the attacks were truly directly caused by the 
cartoons, will be relevant factors throughout Parts II, III, and IV of this Article.  
Finally, the Danish cartoon controversy also suggests that non-violent protests can 
be as effective as violent ones. It was the non-violent threat of a boycott, for example, 
which initially caused Denmark to apologize for the cartoons.163 Unfortunately, it seems 
that this is one lesson from the Danish cartoons controversy that has been forgotten, as 
non-violent protests played only minor roles in the two subsequent controversies. Part IV 
discusses how the non-violent protests show the potential for a marketplace-based 
response, instead of acts of violence. 
 
II. PRE-PUBLICATION RESTRICTIONS ON PROVOCATIVE CONTENT FORBIDDEN 
 
The next two Sections of this Article consider a variety of categories of speech that 
have been deemed less worthy of Constitutional protection and therefore are more easily 
proscribed. Section A considers speech that has been deemed sufficiently dangerous to 
national security that it justifies restraints. The Supreme Court has effectively narrowed 
this category to only include speech that “inevitably, directly, and immediately cause[s]” 
                                                           
153 See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra notes 81–90 and accompanying text.   
155 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
157 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 46–58 and accompanying text.  
160 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
161 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
163 See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.  
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harm to national security, e.g. the disclosure of national security secrets.164 With respect 
to the publication of national security secrets, the confidential information itself justifies 
government intervention, in contrast to the publication of provocative materials where it 
is the reaction or conduct of those receiving the knowledge that might encourage 
restraint.165  
Section B then turns to post-publication remedies, and examines fighting words, 
incitement, and true threats as paradigmatic categories of unprotected speech. Each of 
these is contrasted to provocative speech to show why a restriction on such speech would 
be inappropriate. It also discusses two statutory prohibitions on speech that the Supreme 
Court recently reviewed, to illustrate that any bans on provocative content would fail 
strict scrutiny. 
 
A. The National Security Exception is Exceptionally Narrow 
       
In a situation where the government is aware that a newspaper is about to publish 
or republish a set of Muhammad images, it might wish to seek an injunction against the 
publication using the argument that waiting to act until after the publication of such 
images is futile because the harm will already have been done and violence will likely 
follow.166 Such an effort from the government would be based on the national security 
exception that was established by the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. 
Olson167 and in the Pentagon Papers168 case. These cases, however, make it clear that 
this exception is very narrow, and only arises in such circumstances where speech will 
“inevitably, directly, and immediately cause” harm to national security.169 
  As a rule, prior restraints have traditionally been treated with great skepticism by 
U.S. Courts.170 In Near, the Supreme Court firmly rejected prior restraints on publication 
outside of a few narrow exceptions.171 In that case, a Minnesota law, which restrained the 
publication of “malicious” or “scandalous” newspapers, was struck down as a violation 
of the First Amendment.172 The Court explored the history of the First Amendment and 
                                                           
164 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
165 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
166 Although such arguments have not been made specifically with regard to inflammatory images, there 
has been much scholarly discussion in recently years of prior restraints on speech because of the Edward 
Snowden and WikiLeaks scandals. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, A Liberal Communitarian Approach to 
Security Limitations on the Freedom of the Press, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1141 (2014); David E. 
Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). See generally Robert A. Sedler, The Media and National 
Security, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1025 (2007); Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the 
Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 185 (2007). 
167 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
168 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
169 Id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
170 A comprehensive definition of prior restraints is outside of the scope of this article because prior 
restraints can take many forms. See generally  WAYNE OVERBECK & GENELLE BELMAS, MAJOR 
PRINCIPALS OF MEDIA LAW 63–113 (1st ed., 2015), available at 
http://www.cengage.com/resource_uploads/downloads/0534620051_50487.pdf. Generally, however, 
mentions of “prior restraints” in this article refer to any effort to prevent the publication of images of the 
Prophet Muhammad.  
171 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931). 
172 Id. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY  [2016 
 18 
found that opposition to British abuses of prior restraint was one of the reasons the First 
Amendment was ratified.173 As such, prior restraints generally received far stricter 
scrutiny than restraints on speech that occurred after publication.174 Nevertheless, the 
Court emphasized that “the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely 
unlimited.”175 In so doing, the Court laid out a few potential exceptions.176 Most 
significantly, the Court recognized that “[w]hen a nation is at war many things that might 
be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured . . . .”177 In such a situation, the government “might prevent” speech that causes 
“actual obstruction” of recruiting services, or “the publication of the sailing dates of 
transports or the number and location of troops.”178   
While this exception has at times been called the “national security” exception, it is 
narrower than a grant of authority to restrict any speech that endangers national security; 
it focuses on either speech that causes “actual obstruction,” or the publication of 
information that will lead to harm to troops and troop movements.179  
The Pentagon Papers case revealed the narrow scope of this specific exception. 
The United States government sought to block publication in the New York Times of the 
Pentagon Papers study, which had been leaked by former military analyst Daniel 
Ellsberg.180 The Court’s opinion was extraordinarily brief. The Court, in a 6-3 opinion, 
emphasized that “[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court 
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,”181 and that the 
government had not met the “heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of 
such a restraint.”182 The Supreme Court as a whole offered no further analysis.  
However, each of the Justices on the Court at the time wrote a separate concurrence 
or dissent outlining his views on the case. Because of the myriad of concurrences, it is 
difficult to discern the core holding from the Pentagon Papers case.183 Yet, when 
                                                           
173 See id. at 723. 
174 Id.; See Overbeck, supra note 170, at 63. 
175 Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
176 The Court also wrote that “[t]he security of the community life may be protected against incitements to 
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.” Id. This exception closely follows the 
traditionally unprotected category of incitement, which will be considered in greater depth in a subsequent 
Section of this Article. See infra Section III.B. The other exceptions mentioned in Near, such as the 
prevention of the publication of obscenity, and the preservation of private rights of action, are not relevant 
to the publication of offensive films or cartoons and are outside the scope of this Article. See infra Section 
III.B. 
177 Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). See infra Section 
III.B. 
178 Near, 283 U.S. at 716. For examples of when the press has leaked information that was arguably 
harmful to national security, see Etzioni, supra note 166, at 1153–56. 
179 See Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition of Prior 
Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1132–33 (2001) (suggesting that national security harms must stem 
from the “certainties of war”). But see Stanley Godofsky & Howard M. Rogatnick, Prior Restraints: The 
Pentagon Papers Case Revisited, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 527, 554 (1988) (suggesting that, in order to avoid a 
strict scrutiny analysis and potential invalidation, courts will declare that national security classifications 
are not necessarily prior restraints). 
180 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
181 Id. (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
182 Id. (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).  
183 As Professor Sims has noted, the “boundaries of the case remain largely uncharted.” John Cary Sims, 
Triangulating the Boundaries of the Pentagon Papers, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 341, 342 (1993). 
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examining the separate opinions as a whole, it is clear that prior restraints are 
presumptively unconstitutional, and that even the national security exception only applies 
in narrow circumstances. While Justices Black and Douglas would have completely 
eliminated the Near exceptions, the rest of the Court at least suggested that exceptions 
could exist, and thus rejected such an absolutist position.184 Although the other 
concurrences were each highly critical of unilateral executive action,185 and fearful that 
an overly broad national security exception would lead to the suppression of speech, they 
did recognize that the government would have the authority to prevent publication of 
material which would  “inevitably, directly, and immediately cause” harm to national 
security.186  As a result of the multitude of concurrences, it is not clear how broad the 
national security exception ultimately is,187 but the opinion does reveal that a very 
                                                           
184 See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714–19. More recent scholarship has given deeper historical 
underpinning to the Black and Douglas absolutist approach. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Smith, Prior Restraint: 
Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 448–58 (1987). 
185 Justice Marshall in particular took umbrage at the fact that the executive was acting when Congress had 
expressly refused to create a cause of action, but he acknowledged that at least “in some situations” the 
executive could get an injunction unilaterally. See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 742 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). Justice Marshall seemed to rely on the tripartite distinction that the Court had made in the 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. case between actions the executive takes with either Congressional 
approval, Congressional indifference, or Congressional opposition. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952). Because there was evidence that Congress had considered and 
rejected allowing the executive to get a prior restraint for national security leaks, it fit in the final category 
and was presumptively improper. See id. at 745–46. For the purposes of this paper, this distinction will not 
be examined closely, but it is certainly far more likely that a legislatively enacted prior restraint for 
provocative material could withstand scrutiny than could one sought solely by the executive. A legislative 
enactment would also make it likely that the standard for a prior restraint would be judicially manageable, 
which is an issue that will be further discussed below. See infra Section II.B.   
186 This seems to be the prevailing consensus of courts and scholars. See, e.g., David Corneil, Comment, 
Harboring WikiLeaks: Comparing Swedish and American Press Freedom in the Internet Age, 41 CAL. W. 
INT'L L.J. 477, 512 (2011) (“Case law has determined that the holding in New York Times Co. is represented 
by Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, which asserts that prior restraints on classified government 
information are only justified when publication ‘will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable 
damage.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 730)); see also Harold Edgar & Benno 
C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 364 (1986) (“Presumably, it follows that irreparable injury would somehow 
overcome the absence of congressional action.”).  
187 A possible majority of the Court seems to have supported a broad definition of “national defense.” 
Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, emphasized that restraint of information was justified not only for 
information that would cause “grave and irreparable injury to the United States,” but also when the 
information would have “broad connotations” such as “national preparedness.” See Pentagon Papers, 403 
U.S. at 739–40 (White, J., concurring). Together with the three dissenters, they appear to have formed a 
majority in favor of a broad reading of the national security exception. See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 
731–39 (White, J., concurring), 752–63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
On the other hand, Justices Black and Douglas wrote in favor of completely abolishing the national 
security exception. Id. at 714–24. Justice Brennan would have narrowed it to “a single, extremely narrow 
class of cases” involving either a state of war, a situation “tantamount to a time of war,” or a situation in 
peacetime where the consequences of inaction would be tantamount to a nuclear holocaust. See id. at 726 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, a recent case regarding a material support for terrorism statute 
again suggests that the Court is willing to accept a broad definition of national security when articulated by 
Congress. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) This case will be discussed in depth in 
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specific and concrete harm is necessary before a prior restraint is permissible.188 In 
addition, because The Pentagon Papers case focused solely on the leaks portion of the 
Near exception and said nothing about speech that causes “actual disruption,” it is not 
clear whether an exception applies to material which does not convey national secrets, 
but is still harmful to national security.189  
Other Supreme Court cases suggest that exceptions to the ban on prior restraint are 
to be interpreted narrowly. For instance, in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, the 
Court rejected an attempt to impose a prior restraint in order to prevent an “invasion of 
privacy” through the disclosure of critical literature.190 In another case involving an 
injunction against a political rally, the Court recognized that there are “special, limited 
circumstances in which speech is so interlaced with burgeoning violence that it is not 
protected by the broad guarantee of the First Amendment,” but found that necessary 
procedural safeguards, such as notice and the ability for parties to present counter 
arguments, were not met.191 The Court has also emphasized that prior restraints can only 
be allowed if they are “assured an almost immediate judicial determination of the validity 
of the restraint.”192 These cases all suggest that the exceptions to prior restraint are 
limited, and are meant to be narrowly construed and guarded with robust procedural 
safeguards.193 It thus seems unlikely that the existing exception would be broadened to 
encompass the publication of provocative material.194  
                                                                                                                                                                              
Section III.B. See Frances Howell Rudko, Searching for Remedial Paradigms: Human Rights in the Age of 
Terrorism, 5 U. MASS. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 116, 139 (2010). 
188 Reviewing the specific claims advanced by the Solicitor General in his secret brief shows that most of 
the claims focused on generalities and abstract harms which were uncertain to occur, which fails to fulfill 
the requirement that publication “inevitably, directly, and immediately cause” harm. See generally Sims, 
supra note 183, at 413–14 (describing the various claims made by the government in the secret brief).  
189 In the Court’s recent United States v. Alvarez decision, the plurality seemed to broadly categorize Near 
as creating a speech exemption for “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has 
the power to prevent.” 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). However, the Court also emphasized that “a 
restriction under” this category of speech “is most difficult to sustain.” Id. (citing Pentagon Papers, 403 
U.S. 713). For further discussion of Alvarez, see infra Section III.B. 
190 See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1971). 
191 See Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968). 
192 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
193 It has been argued that since Pentagon Papers there has been a “changing judicial attitude toward the 
kind of national security claims that were put forward and almost summarily rejected in 
the Pentagon Papers case.” Thomas S. Martin, National Security and the First Amendment: A Change in 
Perspective, 68 A.B.A. J. 680, 684 (1982). In the reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks the country 
seemed to show a greater willingness to restrain speech in the name of national security. The Humanitarian 
Law Project case (discussed in Section III.B) shows that perhaps the Supreme Court is more willing to 
uphold restrictions on speech when the goal of the restriction is to combat terrorism. However, the Supreme 
Court itself has not shown any indication of a relaxing of the standard for prior restraints to be issued and 
continues to aggressively strike down what it sees as prior restraints. 
194 One unanswered question that remains after Near and Pentagon Papers is whether additional exceptions 
can be recognized. In Pentagon Papers, Justice Brennan said that there was only “a single, extremely 
narrow class of cases” that justified prior restraints, suggesting that he did not recognize the other 
exceptions that the Court mentioned in Near, such as incitement or obscenity, let alone the possibility of 
additional exceptions. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring). David Fialkow has 
written that contrary to Justice Brennan’s argument, the national security exception remains the easiest 
exception to trigger, but it is not the only one that exists. See David E. Fialkow, Note, The Media's First 
Amendment Rights and the Rape Victim's Right to Privacy: Where Does One Right End and the Other 
Begin?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 745, 750–54 (2006) (arguing that the national security exception is easier to 
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Subsequent cases have again affirmed that prior restraints are presumptively 
invalid195 and subject to the strictest scrutiny.196 The Court also clarified that such 
restraint is only proper when “the evil that would result . . . is both great and certain and 
cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures.”197 Thus, the harm that would result from 
a publication must be “great and certain,” and the measure of restraint must be truly 
necessary before prior restraints will be permitted.198 As the following section shall 
illustrate, provocative images of Muhammad fall far short of this lofty standard. 
 
B. The National Security Exception Should Not Apply to Provocative Speech 
 
As outlined in the previous Section, prior restraints for national security purposes 
are only permitted in very narrow circumstances, specifically when publication 
“inevitably, directly, and immediately” causes harm to national security. Allowing the 
government to block the publication of provocative or offensive speech is inappropriate 
and falls short of this high standard. This Section discusses several concerns that such 
prior restraints would raise if applied to offensive speech, such as images of Muhammad. 
First, such restrictions would run afoul of precedent declaring that prior restraints are 
inappropriate for preventing religious offense. Second, such restrictions cannot be said to 
“inevitably, directly, and immediately” cause harm to national security. Third, the harm 
caused by such speech differs fundamentally from the harm caused by the release of 
national security secrets. Fourth, because of these differences, restrictions on provocative 
speech would not be judicially manageable. Finally, these restrictions would be 
ineffective for both technological and pragmatic reasons.   
First, the Supreme Court has already rejected an expansion of the prior restraint 
doctrine for offensive religious material. In a case highly relevant to the publication of 
offensive religious images, the Supreme Court concluded that avoiding offending 
                                                                                                                                                                              
get, but it is not the only prior restraint exception to survive Pentagon Papers). As Professor Meyerson 
noted, much of the problem with defining prior restraints stems from the fact that “the Court neither 
defined prior restraint, nor explained precisely why injunctions fit within a definition of prior restraint.” 
Meyerson, supra note 179, at 1087. 
195 See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (right to a fair trial could not justify restraint 
on press access and publication about a trial). 
196 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 766 (1994) (noting that there is a “heavy 
presumption” against the constitutionality of prior restraints). 
197 CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994). 
198 Some scholars have labeled laws like those requiring a permit for a parade as prior restraints, because 
they require some sort of preliminary assessment of speech. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-36, at 1046–47 (2d ed. 1988) (noting examples of restrained activities). See 
also Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the 
Information Age?, 18 REV. LITIG. 317, 327 (1999) (discussing prior restraints that the Court has allowed). 
These restraints seem to be distinct from the type of prior restraint sought in Pentagon Papers for at least 
two reasons. First, restrictions on permits are focused on time, place, or manner, which generally has been 
subject to more limited scrutiny. Second, the Supreme Court has required that permit policies be based on 
clearly articulable standards and may not leave too much discretion to those implementing the policy. In 
contrast, it is much more difficult to articulate clear standards for a national security exception. For these 
reasons, for purposes of this article, permits and other time, place, and manner restrictions are not treated as 
a form of prior restraint.  
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religious sentiments could not justify a prior restraint on the publication of a sacrilegious 
film.199 The Supreme Court declared that, 
 
from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to 
point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all 
religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior 
restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of 
government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a 
particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, 
speeches, or motion pictures.200  
 
Thus, if the purpose of an injunction is to prevent offense to religious sentiment, such a 
purpose is illegitimate. This decision suggests that any effort to prevent speech that is 
potentially offensive to religious sentiment will be viewed with particular skepticism, 
even if there is a purported national security connection. It is likely that courts will view 
any attempted justification of a restriction as not intended to prevent offense, but merely 
intended to protect against violence, as pretextual.201 
Second, it is difficult or impossible to say that the publication of provocative 
images, such as those of Muhammad, “inevitably, directly, and immediately cause[s]” 
attacks. While it is quite clear that publication of depictions of Muhammad have already 
led to terror attacks both against civilians and U.S. diplomatic and military targets, there 
remain significant problems of timing and causation regarding predicting responses to 
any future publication of provocative speech.202 As already discussed in Part I, it took 
several months after the publication of the Danish cartoons for violent backlash to occur, 
with months of diplomacy, and discussion preceding any violence.203 When American 
Pastor Terry Jones threatened to burn the Koran, the international backlash occurred in a 
mere two weeks.204 In stark contrast, Al Qaeda planned its attack on Charlie Hebdo for 
years before finally executing it.205 It is difficult to determine which of these incidents 
qualify as being caused “immediately,” as a result of publication, and even more difficult 
to evaluate this before the speech is published.   
                                                           
199 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
200 Id. at 505. 
201 Many scholars have noted that the government uses acceptable justifications as pretext to restrict 
unpopular or offensive speech. For more on this “pretext effect” see, for example, Elena Kagan, Private 
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
413, 414 (1996); Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the 
Twentieth Century, 36 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 273 (2008). The potential use of national security as a pretext 
for prior restraints on provocative speech should further tip the scales against upholding a policy of prior 
restraints on provocative speech. 
202 Similar concerns have been raised with regard to the Progressive Magazine case where a district court 
found that the government could prevent the publication of a magazine article that included instructions 
about how to construct an atomic bomb. Professor Meyerson has argued that the judge in the Progressive 
case neglected to demand the proper standard of proof regarding the inevitability of the harm. See 
Meyerson, supra note 179, at 1132–33. 
203 See supra Section I.A.  
204 G. Aaron Leibowitz, Terry Jones and Global Free Speech in the Internet Age, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 509, 516 (2013) 
205 See supra Section I.B. 
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Likewise, the publication or republication of a variety of depictions of the Prophet 
Muhammad has met with tepid or nonexistent reactions, making it difficult to predict 
which cartoons or images will provoke a serious backlash, thus, it is invalid to call the 
reactions “certain” or “inevitable.”  Indeed, as seen in the case of the Danish cartoons, the 
publication of the images led to diplomacy and discussions, which only gradually 
escalated into violence as a result of mistakes on the part of the Danes and exploitation by 
Islamic leaders.206 This suggests that unlike the release of classified intelligence, such as 
the location of troops, the publication of the cartoons cannot be said to generate the type 
of “great and certain” harm needed to justify prior restraints.207  
Directness is also difficult to establish. As the attack on the U.S. Embassy in 
Benghazi illustrates, planned terrorist attacks and spontaneous demonstrations can 
become conflated.208 Likewise, with the Danish cartoons, clerics co-opted the protests for 
general anti-Western or anti-government causes.209 With so many other mixed motivating 
factors, it will be difficult for a court to say that the cartoons will “directly” cause any 
attacks. Professor Tribe has suggested that only “the unusual clarity of the prepublication 
showing of harm” can justify prior restraints.210 Yet, because there are so many 
unpredictable variables with the publication of provocative images, such an “unusual 
clarity” will almost invariably be absent.  
Third, the release of information damaging to national security is fundamentally 
different than the publication of provocative speech. Releasing state secrets directly 
provides an enemy with insider information to which they otherwise would not have had 
access. The danger with publication of classified information is that the information itself 
provides an enemy an opportunity to cause harm.211 While the Government can of course 
move troops from disclosed locations, the harm is already done immediately upon 
publication because the harm is the release of the information itself.212 Release of 
information in this way is often considered irreparable because it cannot be retracted or 
removed from the marketplace after publication.213 In contrast, when publishing of 
depictions of Muhammad, the harm is not in the content or the information itself, but 
rather in the public’s reaction to the content. Neither the Innocence of Muslims film nor 
the various Muhammad cartoons disclosed any state secrets or illegally acquired 
intelligence. Instead, the harm caused by these depictions was that they engendered 
violent attacks against either the publishers or the country of origin. The resulting harm 
was not because of an inherent trait of the author’s intent or of the provocative content, 
but because of the listener’s reaction. 214 The same image that might have been innocuous 
                                                           
206 See supra Section I.A. 
207 Cf.  Stone, supra note 166, at 202. 
208 See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra Section I.A. 
210 TRIBE, supra note 198 § 12-36, at 1047. 
211 It is the fact that “the government must, to a certain extent, keep some information confidential because 
it is simply too sensitive or dangerous to expose to the public” which justifies state secrets being subject to 
prior restraints. See Alexander Blanchard, A False Choice: Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment in a 
Wikileaks World, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 8 (2013). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 The Court’s antipathy towards injunctions in the fair trial context also illustrates this distinction. 
Professor Wells has argued that in the Nebraska Free Press case the Court rejected an injunction “against 
obviously high-value speech” despite “the potential danger caused by that speech.” Such cases involving 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY  [2016 
 24 
only several years ago transforms into a dangerous publication because of the potential 
reaction from terrorists and radicals. As will be discussed further in Part IV, this 
terrorist’s veto is deeply contrary to first amendment principles.   
Fourth, this distinction between national security concerns and the potential for 
extremist responses means that an exception for provocative content would be much less 
judicially manageable than the exception for national security information. With national 
security issues, it is relatively easy to establish that, at the very least, the information is 
classified,215 and related to military positions and strategies.216 The Pentagon Papers case 
suggests that harm to the nation’s reputation or standing is an insufficient harm to trigger 
the national security exception. A court’s inquiry is thus much narrower and more 
judicially manageable in the case of national security intelligence. Judicial decision-
making regarding provocative speech, in contrast to national security concerns, requires a 
far more searching inquiry into whether the speech will provoke a violent reaction.217 The 
court is not simply evaluating the information itself, but the impact that information will 
have. Yet, as seen with each of the above controversies, a wide variety of human factors 
must converge to produce such violent reactions, and it is difficult to predict whether 
publication of a certain set of images or words will cause harm.218 Giving courts such 
vast discretion with regard to determining how harmful the impact of certain speech will 
be is a concern that has led courts to view prior restraints unfavorably: “the line between 
legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling 
censorship are formidable.”219 
 Fifth, the efficacy of prior restraints is also highly questionable in light of the 
incredible developments in technology, and the ability of individuals to disseminate 
information in an instant.220 Even in the 1970s when the Pentagon Papers case was 
decided, Justices White and Stewart noted that usually “publication will occur and the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
high value speech require “a far more complex weighing of factors.” See Christina E. Wells, Bringing 
Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000). 
215 The legislative branch is also involved in questions of classifications, which reduce the concerns raised 
in Pentagon Papers regarding solely executive conduct. See supra note 173.  
216 Indeed, it is clear that this is precisely what happened in the Pentagon Papers case where the Court was 
able to see through the abstract and inconclusive asserted harms of the government, to conclude that 
publication would not cause the kind of imminent harm needed to justify prior restraint. See Pentagon 
Papers, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
217 Professor Tribe argues that evidentiary certainty is what has allowed for prior restraints in certain 
contexts, such as obscenity. A judge can just as easily determine whether something is obscene before 
publication as after because the test is not dependent on the reaction of a third party, but on pre-existing 
community norms. In contrast, with the publication of provocative speech, the harm is solely in the reaction 
of those viewing the speech, which requires evidence that is only available after publication. See TRIBE, 
supra note 198 § 12-36, at 1048. But see David Rudenstine, The Courts and National Security: The Ordeal 
of the State Secrets Privilege, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 37, 90–91 (2014) (arguing that the judiciary can be 
trusted with a greater role in national security matters because “in some landmark national security cases, 
federal judges have exercised meaningful review, and by so doing have contributed to the prestige and 
legitimacy of the courts”).  
218 See supra Section I.D.  
219 Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980). 
220 President Obama suggested as much in his speech before the U.N. regarding the Innocence of Muslims 
video: “But in 2012, at a time when anyone with a cell phone can spread offensive views around the world 
with the click of a button, the notion that we can control the flow of information is obsolete. The question, 
then, is how do we respond?” Obama, supra note 16. 
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damage be done before the Government has either opportunity or grounds for 
suppression,” and that “efficacy” of prior restraints is “doubtful at best.”221 Technological 
advances certainly make the possibility of a successful prior restraint far less likely. As 
has been argued, concern over prior restraint “appears in hindsight almost medieval given 
the ease with which any individual can anonymously upload classified information to the 
Internet and the ease, in turn, with which that information can suddenly ‘go viral.’”222 
Indeed, David Corneil argues that the requirement that publication will “surely result in 
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage,” means that a prior restraint can almost never 
be acquired in time to prevent the release of information.223 Because “[i]nformation 
moves so fast over the Internet by the time a judge [could] consider [this factor], . . . [the 
harm] would already [be] done.”224   
Prior restraints imposed for provocative images are unlikely to be effective.225 For 
one, it is not at all clear that restricting the publication or republication of such images 
will actually do anything to limit violent outrage.226 This is especially true given that 
those seeking to spark outrage are responsible for much of the spread of the 
images.227 These individuals may be outside the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts, and, 
thus, efforts to restrain publication will be unavailing.228 Moreover, given the nature 
of the internet it is far too easy for image to be reposted anonymously. Additionally, 
the mere fact that someone is attempting to publish such an image may be sufficient to 
trigger a reaction, especially if radical elements seek an excuse for provocation.229 Just as 
                                                           
221 Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 733 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
222 Geoffrey Schotter, Shouting Fire in a Burning Theater: Distinguishing Fourth Estate from Fifth Column 
in the Age of Wikileaks, 2 CASE W. RES. J. L. TECH. & INTERNET 117, 127–28 (2011). See also, David 
McCraw & Stephen Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bargain? National Security and Leaks in a Post-
Pentagon Papers World, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 473, 504 (2013) (“[t]o open the door to greater use of 
prior restraints in response to nontraditional publishers would be to erode basic protections of free speech 
without obtaining a benefit worthy of such cost.”). 
223 See Corneil, supra note 186, at 512–13 (quoting Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 730).  
224 Corneil, supra note 186 at 512. 
225 However, there are certain factors that could make a prior restraint occasionally more effective in the 
context of provocative materials (e.g. the Muhammad cartoons), than in the context of the release of state 
secrets. With the latter, once information is out preventing its subsequent dissemination does little to 
prevent the harm. In contrast, with the publication or republication of provocative speech, each new 
instance of publication creates new risks of threats against the author or publisher. Because it is not the 
information contained in the cartoons, but the act of publication and republication that creates the risk, 
preventing the spread of the image may work to limit responsive acts of violence. See Malise Ruthven, Why 
Are the Muhammad Cartoons Still Inciting Violence?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 9, 2011, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/feb/09/why-are-muhammad-cartoons-still-inciting-violence/. 
See also KLAUSEN, supra note 28, at 5 (“Had Jyllands-Posten not published the cartoons in the paper’s 
online edition—and kept them there—only regular subscribers would have seen them. And when the crisis 
reached its zenith six months later, the offending pages would have been composted and available only in a 
few libraries in Denmark.”). 
226 See Leibowitz, supra note 204, at 524 (“Taking the Danish cartoon events as an example, one could 
argue that even if publication of the images could have been avoided, fundamental differences in freedom 
of expression would have still led to violence between [Islamic and Western cultures].”). 
227 See Klausen, supra note 74.  
228 See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing the extraterritorial application of a French order that Yahoo remove holocaust related content 
from its auction sites). 
229 The Terry Jones case is a good example of this. The mere fact that a pastor had stated his intention to 
burn a Koran was sufficient to provoke massive worldwide outrage and protest. How The Florida Quran 
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the Danish imams printed provocative images that had not actually been published,230 it 
would be relatively easy to manufacture a controversy based on the mere allegation that 
such an image was to be published. 
These practical concerns give greater emphasis to the aforementioned doctrinal 
concerns. With so much dependent on how others choose to respond to the 
publication of the images, it is impossible to say that harm “ inevitably, directly, and 
immediately” follows publication. Unlike the release of state secrets, where release of 
the information itself causes harm, organized efforts were needed to provoke 
violence in response to each of the controversial publications.231 Because of the 
potential for individuals to use the threat of harm as a way to stifle speech they find 
offensive, prior restraints are an inappropriate response to provocative images.232 The 
same distinction exists with respect to other categories of unprotected speech 
discussed below. 
 
III. EFFORTS TO PUNISH PROVOCATIVE SPEECH WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
  
As outlined above, allowing prior restraints against the publication of 
provocative images would be deeply inappropriate because the restraint would be 
justified not by the speech itself or the speaker’s intent, but by the reaction of 
listeners and the ability of terrorists to exploit such speech. Due to the same concerns 
about allowing a terrorist’s veto, post-publication punishment of provocative speech 
is likewise inappropriate. Such restrictions would be an unprecedented and 
inappropriate erosion of First Amendment rights.  
To illustrate this point, the first section below considers some of the categories 
of unprotected speech that are most analogous to provocative speech. This analysis 
illustrates that none of the restraints placed on speech in these categories are justified 
solely by the reaction of listeners.  Having established that provocative speech is 
protected speech, the second section considers two recent Supreme Court decisions 
demonstrating that statutes proscribing the publication of provocative content are 
very likely to fail strict scrutiny.  
 
A.  Provocative Images Are Fully Protected Speech 
  
The Supreme Court has emphasized that there might exist “some categories of 
speech that have been historically unprotected . . . but have not yet been specifically 
identified or discussed . . . in our case law.”233 However, before the Court is willing to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Burning Let To Violence In The Middle East (VIDEO), THE HUFFINGTON POST, June 16, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/16/how-did-the-quran-burning_n_849120.html. Analogously, the 
mere threat of the publication of a cartoon featuring Muhammad may be sufficient to incite violence. See 
Leibowitz, supra note 204, at 524. This is especially true given that it is not clear how many of those 
protesting had actually even seen the cartoons. See Thomas Hylland Eriksen, The Cartoon Controversy and 
the Possibility of Cosmopolitanism, HYLLANDERIKSEN.NET 6 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://hyllanderiksen.net/Cosmopolitanism.pdf.  
230 See Gura supra note 27. 
231 See supra Section I.D.  
232 See infra Part IV (discussing the terrorist’s veto). 
233 Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2547 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)). 
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recognize a new category of unprotected speech, it requires “persuasive evidence that a 
novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of 
proscription.”234 This is a burden that those advocating for an exemption for publication 
of offensive content, such as Muhammad cartoons, cannot meet. Not only is there no 
tradition of proscription, but the justifications advanced for the proscription of such 
speech drastically depart from the justifications underlying other unprotected speech.  
    
1. Unlike Fighting Words, Provocative Images Are Speech with High Intrinsic 
Worth 
  
The fighting words exception focuses on whether certain words provoke a violent 
reaction, and for that reason it appears very similar to an exception for provocative 
content.235 At first glance, the fighting words exception seems to provide support for 
restrictions of speech solely based on the reaction of the listener. Indeed, scholars have 
noted that this exception “seems not only archaic but also wholly illogical,” and have 
expressed surprise that this exception has not been “mercifully overruled long since.”236 
Yet, due to fear of a heckler’s veto, the fighting words exception was dramatically 
narrowed by the Supreme Court to only encompass speech of extremely limited social 
value and highly provocative content.237 The Supreme Court has taken a “libertarian 
approach to fighting words cases” and dramatically limited the application of fighting 
words doctrine.238 Indeed, Supreme Court cases have shown that the category of 
impermissible fighting words is incredibly small or even non-existent.239 
The Supreme Court has declared that “[r]esort[ing] to epithets or personal abuse is 
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the 
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that 
instrument.”240 In Chaplinksy v. State of New Hampshire, the Supreme Court affirmed an 
                                                           
234 Id. (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011)). 
235 Despite the narrow application of the fighting words doctrine by the Supreme Court, scholars continue 
to argue for its renewed application in a variety of contexts involving provocative speech. For instance, 
scholars have argued for an approach to fighting words that would allow the Court to include various forms 
of hate speech, but such an approach has been soundly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Scott J. Catlin, 
Note, A Proposal for Regulating Hate Speech in the United States: Balancing Rights Under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 808–09 (1994). But see 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992). Additionally, some have argued that fighting 
words should apply to cyber bullying or anonymous online speech. See Raul R. Calvoz et al., Cyber 
Bullying and Free Speech: Striking an Age-Appropriate Balance, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357, 386–87 (2013); 
see also Sophia Qasir, Note, Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative Regulations, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3651, 3671 (2013). 
236 O'Neil, supra note 12, at 471–72.  
237 Indeed, “the Supreme Court, while never overruling or even qualifying Chaplinsky, has persistently 
failed to find even in-your-face epithets provocative enough to warrant criminal sanctions.” Id. at 476–77; 
see, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 578–79 (1969). 
238 Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 629, 636 (1985). 
239 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 756 (1978) (George Carlin’s profane monologue did 
not constitute fighting words); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (striking down a 
Georgia statute which extended fighting words to “opprobrious” and “abusive” words). 
240 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940). As Professor Gerard has noted, historically laws 
banning lewd and profane words were common at the time of ratification of both the First and Fourteenth 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY  [2016 
 28 
individual’s conviction for addressing “any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any 
other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place.”241 The individual had 
called a City Marshall “a damned fascist,” and the Supreme Court concluded that the use 
of such “epithets or personal abuse” is “of such slight social value as a step to truth” that 
it does not constitute protected speech.242 Even in affirming the conviction, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that the category of fighting words was narrow. Specifically, the Court 
focused on words which “have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person 
to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.”243 The Supreme Court also seemed to 
imply that such words must be uttered in a “face-to-face” setting.244 
Thus, fighting words are punishable precisely because they are considered 
intrinsically valueless, and are delivered in the setting least conducive to discourse and 
most conducive to acts of violence.245 From Chaplinsky and other fighting words cases, 
five limitations on what can be considered fighting words can be drawn. While the 
publication of provocative images like the Muhammad cartoons or the Innocence of 
Muslims film unquestionably includes some of the elements of fighting words, it varies 
from each of these limitations in significant ways.  
First, the words must be of “slight social value.”246 The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that even speech that is highly offensive is protected if it makes a contribution to the 
marketplace of ideas. This is especially true for offensive religious speech. In Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who 
had been convicted for playing in public a record that attacked other churches as 
instruments of the devil.247 The Supreme Court emphasized that in the religious sphere, 
“sharp differences arise,” and because of the urgency of religious messages speakers may 
resort “to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church 
or state, and even to false statement.”248 Yet, despite “the probability of excesses and 
abuses” permitting such speech is “essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on 
the part of the citizens of a democracy.”249 Cantwell thus suggests that provocative 
speech regarding religion has, if anything, heightened constitutional protection as a result 
of the vital nature of religious speech. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Amendment. See Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in A Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free 
Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003, 1017 (1993). 
241 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942). 
242 Id. at 572.  
243 Id. at 573. 
244 Id. at 572. 
245 See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of 
Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1367 (1998) (“Under a rights-based model, speech may properly be 
restricted when it is likely to provoke violence because of its wrongful character.”); see also ALEXANDER 
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 72 (1975) (“There is such a thing as verbal violence, a kind of 
cursing, assaultive speech that amounts to almost physical aggression, bullying that is no less punishing 
because it is simulated.”).  
246 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
247 Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296.  
248 Id. at 310. 
249 Id. 
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It is unfair to say that provocative images are “of such slight social value as a step 
to truth” that they do not deserve Constitutional protection.250 Publication of images of 
Muhammad is meant to provoke the audience into thinking critically about political and 
social events of great importance. The editors of Jyllands-Posten intended to spark a 
discussion on political correctness and the role of religion in a Western Liberal 
democracy, and were in fact able to engender exactly that sort of debate.251 The editors of 
Charlie Hebdo likewise hoped to push the boundaries of acceptable speech, and show 
that Islam is not above caricature or satire.252 Even the Innocence of Muslims film, which 
was deliberately and unquestionably provocative, still was meant to communicate its 
creator’s viewpoint regarding the founding narrative of Islam.253 Just as with the religious 
speech in Cantwell, these images at times indulge in “exaggeration” and in “excesses and 
abuses” but are on a topic of great public and private concern. Unlike epithets merely 
leveled for the sake of insult, which can rightly be described as “weapons hurled in anger 
to inflict injury or invite retaliation,”254 the publication of such images can constitute 
commentary on the state of the world and on dangers of racial Islamic fundamentalism. 
In this sense, the Muhammad images differ greatly from the epithets from Chaplinsky.255 
They are “chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force,” and mere “hostility 
to their assertion or exercise” does not strip such ideas of Constitutional protection. 256  
Second, fighting words must be “directed” at the listener and akin to “a direct 
personal insult,” rather than a more generalized insult or offense.257 Neither wearing a 
profane jacket in a courthouse,258 nor burning an American flag can qualify as fighting 
words.259  
The provocative images involved in the above controversies were not delivered 
“face-to-face” or “directed” at a specific listener. Instead, they were published in 
magazines or on the internet, and contained a general criticism of the Islamic faith or of 
radical Islamic fundamentalism.260 It is therefore inappropriate to call these provocative 
                                                           
250 See Randall P. Bezanson, The Quality of First Amendment Speech, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 275, 
280 (1998) (arguing that the quality of speech often plays a subtle but distinct role in First Amendment 
analysis by courts). 
251 See supra Section I.A. 
252 See supra Section I.C. 
253 See supra Section I.B. 
254 Tribe, supra note 198, at 838. 
255 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
256 Id. at 26. Professor Tribe also argues that Cohen stands for the proposition that it is improper to 
“sterilize discourse by reducing it to logic.” Tribe, supra note 198, at 840.  
257 Fighting words cases have properly been criticized for assuming that “under some circumstances, the 
appropriate and ‘reasonable’ response to speech” is violence. See Sean M. Selegue, Campus Anti-Slur 
Regulations: Speakers, Victims, and the First Amendment, 79 CAL. L. REV. 919, 932 (1991). These 
restrictions on when speech can be considered fighting words cabin the deleterious impact of that 
assumption. 
258 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19–20 (holding that the jacket was not considered fighting words because it was not 
“directed to the person of the hearer,” nor was anyone who saw the jacket “violently aroused.”).  
259 In Texas v. Johnson the majority rejected the argument that flag burning was akin to fighting words 
declaring that “[n]o reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson's generalized expression of 
dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to 
exchange fisticuffs.” 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
260 See Edward Tabash, The First Amendment Provides Full Protection to Innocence of Muslims, FREE 
INQUIRY, Dec. 2012–Jan. 2013, at 12, 
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images “a direct personal insult,” especially considering the huge number of Muslims in 
the world, and the unpredictable nature of each individual’s response to these images.261 
While there is limited Supreme Court precedent for the idea that speech directed at 
groups may be punished,262 this precedent has been seriously called into question263 and 
is highly unlikely to apply in a fighting words setting.264   
Although the flag burning of Texas v. Johnson is closely analogous to the speech in 
the above controversies (both are highly insulting to large groups of individuals who may 
take offense), Johnson has been read to stand for the principle that the government 
“cannot forbid all offensive speech because violence may occasionally result.”265 
Professor Greenawalt has argued that what sets apart a case like Johnson where 
restrictions are impermissible, and other cases where restrictions are allowed, is the 
presence or absence of “specific victims” as opposed to generalized group offense.266 
Additionally, in recent years the Supreme Court has shown even less inclination to allow 
restrictions on speech based on a generalized group offense.267  
                                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.tabash.com/articleAdmin/articles/Innocence%20of%20Muslims%2011-1-12.pdf (“Of course 
Innocence of Muslims isn’t a face-to-face confrontation. It’s not even addressed to individual followers of 
Islam. It ridicules a claimed historical religious figure.”). 
261 Reactions to images of the Prophet Muhammad vary dramatically among Muslims. See Lucas Powers, 
Prophet Muhammad Images Draw Varied Reactions Within Muslim Community, CBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 
2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/prophet-muhammad-images-draw-varied-reactions-within-muslim-
community-1.2899987.  
262 In the defamation context, the Court upheld an Illinois statute that punished group libel, and held that “if 
an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State 
power to punish the same utterance directed at a defined group.” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 
(1952). Some dicta from the Beauharnais case could be analogized to the context of speech offensive to 
religions. For instance, the court discussed how “willful purveyors of falsehood concerning . . . religious 
groups promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered 
life in a metropolitan, polyglot community.” Id. at 259. Moreover, the Court criticized “false or malicious 
defamation of . . . religious groups, made in public places and by means calculated to have a powerful 
emotional impact on those to whom it was presented.” Id. at 261. 
263 See O'Neil, supra note 12, at 483 (“[T]he Beauharnais ruling has not fared well over time and would be 
cited at an advocate's peril.”). 
264 Most scholars suggest that laws that proscribe things such as group defamation or insults targeting a 
broad class would be unconstitutional. See Ronald K. L. Collins, Free Speech, Food Libel, & the First 
Amendment... in Ohio, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 952–53, 978–79 (2d ed. 2002); Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural 
Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 142 n.164 (1992). 
But see Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1145 (2013) 
(suggesting that group defamation and the cross burning from Virginia v. Black are examples of when 
speech against groups can be proscribed). It is worth noting that there are very few things that might be 
considered sufficiently provocative for a whole group, although certain epithets, such as the N-word, come 
to mind. 
265 KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH  34 
(1996).  
266 Id. at 35.  
267 Many have suggested that the Roberts Court takes a more categorical and absolutist approach to free 
speech than previous courts. As such, it is far less likely to recognize a new category of unprotected speech. 
See David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 503, 508 (2001).  
This is especially true given that the Muhammad cartoons touch upon matters of public concern just as 
did the anti-gay speech in Snyder v. Phelps, which the Supreme Court held was protected in an 8-1 
decision. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). See Douglas Behrens, Balancing Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
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Third, the Supreme Court has suggested that any breach of the peace that occurs 
must truly be imminent. For instance, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia statute 
because it covered conduct that did not lead to an “immediate violent response.”268 As 
discussed in Part II, it is difficult to say that publication of the provocative speech caused 
an “immediate violent response.” Indeed, sometimes the publication of provocative 
speech led to threats of attacks that were carried out months or years later. Moreover, in 
each of the controversies, the violent reactions were spurred by provocateurs who sought 
to capitalize on the controversy.269 Thus, mere publication without more cannot be said to 
cause an “immediate violent response” akin to a direct personal attack. Given the 
disparity, in both timing and scope, between the reactions of violence in each of the 
above controversies, it is inaccurate to say that publication of provocative speech will 
always lead to an imminent disturbance of the peace.  
Fourth, fighting words cannot be regulated in a way that takes into account the 
speaker’s viewpoint.270 Even actions that unquestionably constitute fighting words or true 
threats cannot “be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their 
distinctively proscribable content.”271 Yet, that is precisely what would happen if 
provocative speech lost its constitutional protection.272 Many of the newspapers that 
published the Muhammad cartoons also published cartoons lambasting Christianity.273 
Likewise, rituals and practices considered sacred by members of the Church of Jesus-
Christ of Latter-day Saints have been parodied and displayed in musicals and TV 
Shows.274 Yet, even though such speech offends members of these faiths, there is a lack 
of the same sort of vociferous and hateful reaction as to the publication of images of 
Muhammad.275 The resultant application of any exception for provocative speech is that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Claims and First Amendment Protections in Snyder v. Phelps, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 213, 
221 (2013) (discussing the emphasis that the Snyder Court put on the fact that the speech was of public 
concern). Indeed, it seems highly improbable that the same Court which recently found the Westboro 
Baptist Church’s “God Hates Fags” funeral demonstration to be protected speech would find it acceptable 
to punish speech that is highly offensive even to a majority of the general public.  
268 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). 
269 See Jane Kramer, Comment - Images, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 25–26. 
270 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (holding that even though the burning of a cross 
could arguably be considered a true threat, a statute which banned cross burning in certain circumstances 
was unconstitutional because it engaged in viewpoint bias). 
271 Id. 
272 See Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is 
not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”). 
273 See Section I.C (regarding Charlie Hebdo). 
274 See The Publicity Dilemma, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/the-publicity-dilemma; Misha Berson, Mormons View ‘Book of 
Mormon’ More as Opportunity Than Offense, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, 
http://www.seattletimes.com/entertainment/mormons-view-book-of-mormon-more-as-opportunity-than-
offense/.  
275 See Daniel Ortner, Maestro of Dissent: A Radical Proposal: Advocating Cartoon Freedom, BRANDEIS 
HOOT (Oct. 30, 2009), 18, https://issuu.com/thebrandeishoot/docs/the_hoot_10-30-09 (drawing parallels 
between the reaction to the display of Mormon temple rituals in the HBO series “Big Love” and the 
reaction to the publication of cartoons depicting Muhammad); see also Ross Douthat, Blasphemy Revisited, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015), http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/blasphemy-revisited-i/ (“And I 
am very confident that if, say, a group of Christians burned down a movie theater during a screening of 
‘The Last Temptation of Christ’ . . . , or if a Mormon assassinated an actor in ‘The Book of Mormon,’ . . . 
the response across the board and certainly across the left would be that the show must, for the sake of 
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anti-Christian or anti-Mormon speech would be acceptable, while anti-Islamic speech 
restricted.276 This selective prohibition on speech is precisely the evil that the First 
Amendment is intended to prevent.277  
Fifth, the fighting words exception must not be employed to provide an opportunity 
for a heckler’s veto.278 Looking at the Court’s precedent regarding fighting words, it is 
clear that one of the reasons the Court limits fighting words to face-to-face confrontations 
where epithets are personally directed to cause an immediate reaction is that it does not 
want to allow organized and systemic outrage to stifle unpopular or controversial 
ideas.279 The application of this concept to provocative images will be discussed further 
below, but for now it suffices to note that any restriction on provocative speech would 
provide precisely the opportunity for groups to stifle unpopular or offensive speech that 
has been so odious in the fighting words context.   
Each of these restrictions on the scope of the fighting words doctrine has been 
established by the Supreme Court to ensure that the exception does not swallow the 
general rule of freedom to speak out on controversial topics. They illustrate the extent to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
vindicating liberty and rebuking fanaticism, go on.”); Jim Picht, Mormons and Muslims, South Park and 
Charlie Hebdo: Why the Difference?, COMMUNITIES DIGITAL NEWS (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://www.commdiginews.com/politics-2/mormons-and-muslims-south-park-and-charlie-hebdo-why-the-
difference-33042/#KuShuXR2jy8x33jC.01 (“People who watch The Book of Mormon musical don't fear 
violent reprisals from angry Mormons; the South Park creators would have more to fear from Muslims.”); 
Joseph Walker, LDS Church Buys Ad Space in ‘Book of Mormon’ Musical Playbill, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 
6, 2012), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865561906/LDS-Church-buys-ad-space-in-Book-of-
Mormon-musical-playbill.html?pg=all (“’The playbill ad is another example of the LDS Church’s savvy 
response to ‘The Book of Mormon’ musical,’ said award-winning public relations guru Chris Thomas, co-
owner of Intrepid Communications in Salt Lake City.”). But see Michael Brendan Dougherty, The Charlie 
Hebdo Attacks Show That Not All Blasphemies Are Equal, WEEK (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://theweek.com/articles/531501/charlie-hebdo-attacks-show-that-all-blasphemies-are-equal (“But those 
Muslims who are faithful to a religious tradition concerned primarily with restoring fidelity to sources from 
the first three centuries of Islam were not a party to the secularist bargain. And we ought to be aware that 
we are asking them to live as Christians, and to be insulted like them, too.”). 
276 It has been suggested that this effect might even raise Establishment Clause concerns. See Tabash, supra 
note 260, at 12 (“Accordingly, no members of a religion have any greater rights than any others to call 
upon government to censor offensive spoken words, written articles, or films.”). While I find this argument 
highly implausible because the government restriction would have neither the purpose nor effect of 
establishing or favoring religion, this argument draws further attention to lack of viewpoint neutrality. See 
id. (“Any legal system will suffer enormously diminished legitimacy as a protector of free speech if 
advocates of a certain point of view are the only ones given the right to silence opponents. This legitimacy 
would be even more gravely compromised if that legal system harbors even the slightest assumption that 
violence perpetrated by adherents of one set of beliefs—upon hearing or seeing offensive comments—
deserves more lenient treatment than the same kind of violence perpetrated by adherents of any other 
beliefs.”). 
277 See Zvi Triger, Discriminating Speech: The Heterophilia of the Freedom of Speech Doctrine, 19 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 349, 371 (2013) (explaining that “‘feelings’ and ‘hurt’ are not neutral terms,” and 
that attempting to proscribe such speech is a highly subjective and fraught endeavor).  
278 The Sixth Circuit recently issued a powerful decision affirming the importance of defending freedom of 
expression against a heckler’s veto. In that decision, the court affirmed the right of Christian protestors to 
distribute anti-Islamic leaflets at an Arab International Festival. The court found that the police had erred 
when they asked the protesters to disband in the face of an unruly counter-protest where attendees threw 
rocks and other objects at the Christian protesters. See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., Mich., 805 F.3d 
228 (6th Cir. 2015). 
279 Cox, 379 U.S. at 551–52.   
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which a provocative speech exception would deviate from First Amendment norms, and 
would allow for manufactured outrage to drown out voices asserting controversial or 
unpopular points of view.   
 
2. Unlike Incitement or True Threats, Provocative Speech Lacks an Intent to Cause 
Harm 
 
Incitement and true threats illustrate another element common in unprotected 
speech that is absent from the publication of provocative speech. Specifically, both 
incitement and true threats require the speaker to have a certain level of specific intent to 
harm, which is absent in all of the controversies discussed.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines incitement as “[t]he act or an instance of 
provoking, urging on, or stirring up.”280 While this definition of incitement encompasses 
speech that provokes lawless action, as well speech that urges or encourages lawless 
action, the legal standard for incitement limits punishment to only the latter.281 The 
modern test for incitement comes from Brandenburg v. Ohio.282 The state is forbidden 
from proscribing “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” unless “such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.”283 Thus, the intent of the speaker, and whether the speech 
is “directed to inciting,” is critical to determining whether incitement occurred.284 It is 
this key element that distinguishes provocative speech from incitement. As the Supreme 
Court has noted, “mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral 
necessity for a resort to force and violence” is insufficient to qualify as incitement,285 and 
even “offensive and coercive speech” is protected.286 Thus, incitement is punishable 
precisely because the individual speaks with the desire or purpose of facilitating a crime. 
In this way, a speaker is culpable for the conduct of those whom he addresses and 
incites.287  
True threats are punished for substantially similar reasons. True threats are defined 
as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”288 Thus, intent to intimidate or convey a serious threat is an essential 
                                                           
280 Incitement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
281 See Tsesis, supra note 264, at 1146 (considering the distinction between inflammatory speech and 
incitement). 
282 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
283 Id. (emphasis added). There is also an imminence element to incitement, which the Supreme Court has 
strictly construed. Hence, a statement like “we will take the fucking streets later” is not imminent enough to 
constitute incitement. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement 
to Riot in the Age of Flash Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 44 (2012) (“Brandenburg's imminence requirement 
may in fact be extremely temporally strict.”). 
284 With inchoate crimes, such as incitement, a heightened mens rea is traditionally required: in the model 
penal code for instance, criminal conspiracy requires a person to have specific intent or “the purpose of 
promoting or facilitating” the commission of a crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (Am. Law Inst. 2015).  
285 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961). 
286 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (citing Organization for a Better Austin 
v. Keefe, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
287 See Tsesis, supra note 264, at 1151 (arguing that the key distinction between protected and unprotected 
speech is whether “the speaker means to intimidate, defame, or advance criminal conduct.”). 
288 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
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element. Even if serious fear or apprehension occurs, absent the requisite intent, a threat 
cannot be penalized. True threats are also distinct because they make the recipients of the 
threat feel apprehensive for their safety,289 in contrasts to provocative images that do not 
engender in the listener a personal safety concern.290  
Another important contrast between the publication of provocative images and 
incitement or true threats, similar to the distinction from fighting words, involves the 
value of the ideas promoted. The message of the images involved in all three of the 
controversies outlined above included a commentary on the politics of religion, rather 
than mere prompting of illegal activity or threats of such activity, which are often the 
subject of incitement or true threats. As Cass Sunstein has argued, “There is little 
democratic value in protecting simple counsels of murder.”291 Thus, the high bar for 
prosecuting incitement or true threats containing little social value suggests that even 
greater caution is appropriate when prosecuting the publication of cartoons conveying a 
myriad of political messages.292 Given these guidelines, true threats and incitement are 
not protected because they are delivered with intent to either incite or threaten, and they 
fail to contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Provocative speech differs on both fronts. 
For these reasons, provocative speech should be considered fully protected speech. 
 
B. Efforts to Punish the Publication of Provocative Speech Would Fail Strict 
Scrutiny 
 
Having established that provocative speech is fully protected, any law restricting or 
barring the publication of such speech would be subject to strict scrutiny.293 Two recent 
Supreme Court decisions illustrate why any attempt to proscribe provocative speech 
would likely fail strict scrutiny. In the first, the Supreme Court upheld, but narrowly 
construed, a restriction on speech carried out in conjunction with a terrorist 
organization.294 In the second, the Supreme Court rejected efforts to punish false speech 
regarding veteran’s status.295 
                                                           
289 See Lawrence, supra note 24, at 700–01 (discussing the difference between bias crimes and hate speech 
based on similar terms).  
290 In June 2015, the Supreme Court decided the case of Elonis v. United States, which involved the 
question of which mens rea requirement is sufficient to convict a speaker for making a threatening 
statement. 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court refused to draw a clear line and 
merely concluded that negligence is insufficient. See Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Internet Threats 
Still in Legal Limbo?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 1, 2015, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-internet-threats-still-in-legal-limbo/; see also Clay 
Calvert et al., Rap Music and the True Threats Quagmire: When Does One Man's Lyric Become Another's 
Crime?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 26 (2014) (urging the Court to adopt a standard that, at the very least, 
takes into account the listener’s actual knowledge and understanding); P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent 
in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context in Analyzing Threatening Internet Messages, 37 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 37, 76 (2015). 
291 Sunstein, supra note 7, at 371; see also Noah C.N. Hampson, Hacktivism: A New Breed of Protest in a 
Networked World, 35 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 511, 538 (2012) (“There is little to commend speech that 
leaves in its wake material destruction and physical injury.”). 
292 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1150 (2005) (suggesting that 
crime-facilitating speech which touched on issues relevant to public policy should get extra protection).  
293 See supra Section III.A.  
294 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
295 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537. 
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In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that 
restricted material support to terrorist organizations, including training and other speech 
related activities.296 Material support was widely defined to include “any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service.”297 Such material support must be knowingly granted, 
but there need not be intent to further the organization’s terrorist activities.298 In a closely 
divided decision, the Supreme Court found that the statute was not overly vague and did 
not violate the First Amendment.299 
The Humanitarian Law Project decision has been widely derided by scholars as 
contorting existing First Amendment doctrine to chill speech.300 Certainly, in theory, 
allowing speech to be proscribed because it helps terrorist groups seems like a dramatic 
expansion.301 However, the Court’s ruling was ultimately much narrower than that. The 
Supreme Court expressly construed the statute to not apply to any form of “independent 
activity.”302 Thus, any activity such as the publication of a cartoon that is not done “under 
the direction of, or in coordination with [foreign] terrorist organizations” is not 
punishable under this statute.303 
This important distinction led the Court to conclude that the statute was “carefully 
drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech,” which involved direct coordination 
with a terrorist organization.304 As such, even though the law directly burdened speech, 
the Court found that it successfully met strict scrutiny. In terms of the arguments for 
proscribing provocative speech, this distinction is completely absent. None of those who 
                                                           
296 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8. 
297 Id. at 8–9. 
298 “Indeed, it seems possible to convict someone of material support even if they possessed the 
diametrically opposed intent to prevent further terrorist attacks.” Alexandra Link, Trying Terrorism: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Material Support, and the Paradox of International Criminal Law, 34 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 439, 468 (2013). 
299 The Court purported to be applying strict scrutiny, but scholars have rightly suggested that the Court’s 
reasoning “exhibited unprecedented deference to the government, despite purporting to apply strict scrutiny 
to a content-based speech restriction.” Eileen Kaufman, Deference or Abdication: A Comparison of the 
Supreme Courts of Israel and the United States in Cases Involving Real or Perceived Threats to National 
Security, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 95, 111 (2013). 
300 See Andrew V. Moshirnia, Valuing Speech and Open Source Intelligence in the Face of Judicial 
Deference, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 385, 414–19 (2013). 
301 Indeed, an overly broad reading might even encompass the publication of provocative cartoons of 
Muhammad. Given the acts of violence perpetuated as a result of these images, an individual publishing a 
provocative image of Muhammad knows that such an image would provide a terrorist organization with 
“property” or a “service,” which could then be used to increase recruitment or rally anti-Americanism. Yet, 
such a broad application of the statute correctly seems to be a gross expansion of what Congress intended 
the statute to proscribe.  
302 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 24. 
303 Id. at 26. 
304 Of course, scholars have argued that even with this limitation, the statute invites excessive prosecution 
and produced a chilling effect. See Sam Adelsberg, Freya Pitts & Sirine Shebaya, The Chilling Effect of the 
“Material Support” Law on Humanitarian Aid: Causes, Consequences, and Proposed Reforms, 4 HARV. 
NAT'L SEC. J. 282, 293 (2013); Brandon James Smith, Protecting Citizens and Their Speech: Balancing 
National Security and Free Speech When Prosecuting the Material Support of Terrorism, 59 LOY. L. REV. 
89, 102 (2013) (discussing the messy application of Holder to conflicts in territories controlled by Islamic 
fundamentalist groups). But see Brandon James Smith, Protecting Citizens and Their Speech: Balancing 
National Security and Free Speech When Prosecuting the Material Support of Terrorism, 59 LOY. L. REV. 
89, 106 (2013) (favorably comparing the distinction between coordinated and independent activity to the 
framework for campaign finance from Buckley v. Valeo).  
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published provocative images were working “in coordination with” those who committed 
acts of violence. Indeed, they deplored and spoke out critically against the violence that 
occurred.305 Even though the publishers may have known that their speech could be used 
by terrorists to encourage violent conduct, there was no coordination between the 
publishers and any terrorist groups, a factor the Court found necessary in order to avoid 
serious constitutional problems. Indeed, the majority made it clear that, “we in no way 
suggest that a regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster, even if 
the Government were to show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist 
organizations.”306 Here again, the Court chooses to leave only intrinsically dangerous 
speech open to restrictions: speech that is fostered from close coordination with a terrorist 
organization.  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Alvarez—striking down 
the Stolen Valor Act that made it illegal to falsely claim to have received a military 
decoration or medals—further illustrates that a prohibition on provocative speech would 
fail strict scrutiny.307 Even though these kinds of lies “may offend the true holders of the 
Medal” and “insult[] their bravery and high principles,” the Supreme Court emphasized 
that the remedy for such false speech “is speech that is true.”308  
The plurality opinion discusses at length a wide range of false statements that have 
been constitutionally proscribed, including false statements made to government officials, 
perjury, and false representations on behalf of the government.309 In each instance, the 
Court emphasized that the context and nature of the speech distinguished it from simple 
lies or puffery.310 Perjured statements are particularly problematic because they 
“undermine[] the function and province of the law.”311 Perjury statues characterize the 
harm of perjury as inherent in the fact that an individual lied despite the “formality and 
gravity” of the oath proceeding, rather than dependent on any subsequent consequences. 
The same is true of other false speech regulations, such as those for false representation 
that one is a government official.312 The Court emphasized that these types of speech 
“implicate fraud or speech integral to criminal conduct,” and therefore can be 
proscribed.313  
Again, while the Court is willing to affirm restrictions on speech that causes direct 
harm by its nature, it is unwilling to allow restrictions on speech that only tangentially 
causes harm. Like false statements about military honor, the publication of the 
Muhammad cartoons only caused indirect harm. Unlike perjury or pretending to be a 
police officer, neither the content of the publication itself, nor the context of publication, 
causes the kind of direct harm that the Court has identified as punishable. In light of 
                                                           
305 See supra Part I. 
306 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39. 
307 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537 (striking down a statute that made it illegal to falsely claim receipt of 
military decoration or medals). 
308 Id. at 2550. The Court also noted that “[o]nly a weak society needs government protection or 
intervention before it pursues its resolve to preserve the truth.” Id. 
309 Id. at 2546. 
310 Id. (an example is the Court’s characterization of perjury as “at war with justice,” because it “threatens 
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Humanitarian Law Project and Alvarez, it is highly unlikely that a statute prohibiting the 
publication of provocative images could survive strict scrutiny. 
 
IV. THE TERRORIST’S VETO AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
  
As the preceding sections have shown, efforts to prohibit provocative speech would 
be especially pernicious because such speech suffers from none of the inherent defects of 
the categories of unprotected speech, but instead would be proscribed solely on the basis 
of listeners’ reactions. This would constitute a terrorist’s veto. The terrorist’s veto is 
similar in many ways to the heckler’s veto that the Court has spoken out against in the 
fighting words context, but has some distinctive features that make it significantly more 
troubling from a First Amendment standpoint. Although these ideas have been discussed 
in Parts II and III of this Article, this Part brings together strands of analysis from the 
various types of speech discussed in order to more fully describe how a terrorist’s veto is 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.  
First, the value of the speech threatened by the terrorist’s veto is far more likely to 
be high-value political and/or religious speech that deserves heightened protection.314 For 
instance, the heckler’s veto frequently arises in the fighting words context where speech 
is of “slight social value,”315 or in response to threats or incitement that have “little 
democratic value.”316 Thus, any heckler’s veto in those contexts is less likely to disrupt 
valuable speech. In contrast, the Muhammad images that led to violence raise important 
questions about religious pluralism, fundamentalism, and the boundaries of speech.317 
The Jyllands-Posten cartoons in particular touched upon matters of ongoing debate and 
discussion in Denmark and elsewhere.318 The Charlie Hebdo cartoons likewise sparked 
debate about the appropriateness of religious satire.319 Even the Innocence of Muslims 
film, which by all accounts lacked artistic value or subtlety, still challenged the 
traditional accounts of the founding of Islam.320 Just as the deeply offensive “God Hates 
                                                           
314 The traditional heckler’s veto also arises in many cases where the speech is highly valuable and fully 
protected. The Court has not allowed a heckler’s veto for fear of stifling such protected speech. See Ruth 
McGaffey, The Heckler's Veto, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 47 (1973) (much of the free speech cases involving 
the heckler’s veto involved “either the Jehovah's Witnesses or labor unions . . . [because b]oth groups had 
enough enemies to make a hostile audience a real possibility in almost any situation.”). 
315 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 
(1949) (involving a highly charged anti-Semitic rant).  
316 Sunstein, supra note 7, at 371. In Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951), the Supreme Court 
held that a police officer acted constitutionally when he disrupted an inflammatory political speech on race 
issues. However, this decision was sharply criticized by Justice Douglas in dissent, and has since been 
widely discredited and viewed as an “extreme manifestation” of the Supreme Court erroneously focusing 
on audience reaction. See Feiner 340 U.S. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the record showed 
“an unsympathetic audience” threatening “to haul the speaker from the stage,” which is precisely the kind 
of threat against which “speakers need police protection.”). David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: 
Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 
59 (1994). It has been “limited to the grounds found by the majority, that the speaker was indeed inciting 
the crowd to riot and inadequate means were available to keep the peace.” Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler's 
Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2007).  
317 See supra Part I. 
318 See supra Section I.A.  
319 See supra Section I.C.  
320 See supra Section I.B. 
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Fags” signs held by the Westboro Baptist church deserved heightened First Amendment 
protection, even though such speech was highly provocative, so too does the publication 
of provocative images of the Prophet Muhammad. 321 Additionally, as suggested earlier, 
speech that touches on religion deserves added protection because of the vital nature of 
religious discourse.322 The terrorist’s veto will almost always target highly valuable 
speech touching on vital matters of politics and religion, which will require protection 
under the First Amendment.  
Second, the terrorist’s veto seems completely unconcerned with the speaker’s 
intent. As discussed in Part III of the article, in many cases where the heckler’s veto 
arises, a speaker will have diminished protection because of an intent to harm. Although 
malicious intent is not expressly required with fighting words, it is implied by the fact 
that the speech must be a “direct personal insult” akin to “an invitation to exchange 
fisticuffs.”323 Malicious intent is expressly required with incitement and true threats 
where the speaker either expressly desires that an unlawful act occurs, or intends to 
frighten or intimidate the listener.324 In contrast, those publishing images of the Prophet 
Muhammad had a wide variety of intents: of those discussed, the Innocence of Muslims 
filmmaker stands on one extreme, as he unapologetically hoped to offend though he did 
not desire a violent reaction;325 the Jyllands-Posten editors hoped to spark a conversation 
about censorship, but were certainly aware of the possibility of offending; and on the 
other end of the spectrum Jyttee Klausen wrote an academic book on the Danish cartoon 
saga and had no desire to offend or provoke, but still had her speech stifled by the 
terrorist’s veto.326 The Charlie Hebdo editors are somewhat in the middle between these 
two extremes, as they sought to lampoon and satirize, but also acted with the goal of 
                                                           
321 See supra note 270 and accompanying text; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of 
Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 900–01 (2013) (“Chief Justice Roberts found that the speech enjoyed the full 
protection of the First Amendment, and held that a standard for civil liability based on the ‘outrageousness’ 
of speech comes too close to empowering a ‘heckler['s] veto.’”). 
322 Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); see also Tabash, supra note 260, at 11 (“An 
integral part of freedom requires that anyone be permitted to express views that are deeply offensive to 
someone else’s beliefs.”); Tyll van Geel, Citizenship Education and the Free Exercise of Religion, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 293, 365 (2000) (arguing that fears of “religious divisiveness” can create ‘heckler’s veto’). 
Part of the right to speak about matters of religious concern surely involves the right to criticize the faith of 
others. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accommodation 
Law, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 57, 69 (2001), http://www2.law.ucla.edu/volokh/harass/religion.pdf (“Much 
religious discourse, and much ideological discourse more generally, involves condemnation of others’ 
views as well as expression of one’s own. One way of proving the merits of your ideas is by showing the 
error of rival ideas. If the government may use the force of law to suppress such condemnatory speech, then 
we have lost a great deal of our First Amendment protection.”).  
323 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398 (1989). 
324 See supra Section III.A.ii. 
325 But see Email from Seth Barrett Tillman to author, supra note 87. If it were true that Nakoula actually 
intended to direct his speech in order to specifically trigger an act of violence against Jews or Israelis, his 
act would share a common intent component with incitement or true threats. See supra Section III.B. Under 
such narrow circumstances it might be permissible to proscribe such behavior. However, it might be 
difficult to draft a statute that would narrowly target only this class of behavior without including otherwise 
protected speech. As evidenced by the continuing ambiguity regarding Nakoula’s motives, intent would 
also be quite difficult to prove in such cases. 
326 See supra Section I.D.  
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pushing the boundaries of free speech.327 The terrorist’s veto is dangerous because it is a 
blunt force, indifferent to whether the author actually intended to offend.  
Third, because the terrorist’s veto, when granted, validates the feeling of offense or 
outrage, it can further encourage encroachment on once acceptable speech. This is 
powerfully illustrated by outrage over images featuring Muhammad. Images of the 
Prophet Muhammad were an accepted part of both Christian and Islamic society until 
very recently, and yet fear of potentially violent reactions has led to publishers to decide 
not to publish or republish such historically acceptable images;328 Similarly, Comedy 
Central censored an episode of the show South Park that included images of Muhammad, 
despite the fact that the episode had previously aired without incident.329 What has 
changed is not the nature of the speech itself nor its publication, but simply the reaction 
from the audience. It is the radicalization of certain sects of Islam that has led to 
divergent reactions rather than a change in the content or form of the speech.330 As 
attitudes continue to harden towards the publication of images of Muhammad, it is likely 
that the terrorist’s veto will continue to chill more and more content that was once 
acceptable.331 
Fourth, the heckler traditionally seeks to disrupt the speech of the individual 
speaking; in contrast, the terrorist’s veto often instead targets nations, or individuals 
wholly unconnected to the speech.332 As such, the terrorist’s veto creates an environment 
where the speaker not only fears for his own safety, but is chilled out of a fear of 
endangering others. Newspapers chose not to republish the cartoons because they feared 
that their staffers, writers, or editors would be targeted, even if many of them were 
unconnected to the cartoons and were merely reporting on them.333 The terrorist’s veto 
turns the choice to publish into one that endangers others in addition to oneself, which 
increases the chilling effect.  
                                                           
327 See supra Section I.C. 
328 See John McManus, Have Pictures of Muhammad Always Been Forbidden?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30814555. See also Christiane Gruber, How the “Ban” on 
Images of Muhammad Came to Be, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/how-ban-
images-muhammad-came-be-300491. Scholars debate the degree to which such depictions were 
“accepted,” however some argue that there was never a per se “ban” on depictions of the Prophet 
Muhammad as there is today. Instead, the legality of such images in the past was determined on their 
content and context.  
329 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
330 As Professor Volokh has explained, it becomes difficult to draw the line as to which speech is seen as 
overly provocative or hate speech. See Volokh, supra note 5 (“Might it have been helpful to explain, if only 
briefly, just what criticisms of Islam (or of other religions) should be seen as criminal—or even immoral—
‘hate speech’? Any criticisms that someone can label ‘punching down’? Any that are seen as blasphemous 
by people who are willing to respond with murder? Any that are ‘crude’ or ‘vulgar’ in their words, or 
perhaps in their artistic style, which is too much like ‘graffiti’ rather than ‘cartoons?’.”).  
331 For instance, ISIS has urged that Professor Yasir Qadhi be killed for his criticism of ISIS and the 
Charlie Hebdo attacks. See Ursula Madden, Mid-South Professor Targeted by ISIS, WMC ACTION NEWS 5 
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.wmcactionnews5.com/story/28225768/mid-south-professor-targeted-by-isis. 
332 But see Tom Hentoff, Speech, Harm, and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and 
Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1460 (1991) (“Hostile reaction can be by the audience 
against the speaker, the so-called ‘heckler's veto’ class of cases; by different members of the audience 
against one another; or by the audience against a different group or vice versa.”). 
333 See supra notes 347–53 and accompanying text.  
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Fifth, with the terrorist’s veto, grassroots outrage is co-opted by organized 
extremism. As such, the organized nature of the terrorist’s veto differs from a heckler’s 
veto scenario where outrage is typically spontaneous and disorganized.334 In each of the 
controversies discussed, organized groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, instigated 
violence both because of opposition to the speech and in order to achieve political 
objectives.335 The terrorist’s veto is dangerous because the forces seeking to stifle speech 
are particularly well organized and capable of following through on threats, and are 
therefore likely to make further demands once their initial demands are met.   
Sixth, just as with the traditional heckler’s veto, allowing for the suppression of 
offensive speech if it triggers a violent reaction would have the perverse incentive of 
discouraging civilized and reasoned responses to offensive material.336 Even though the 
peaceful response to the Danish cartoons succeeded in producing an official apology and 
encouraged a thoughtful debate, ultimately the violent attacks are what remained in the 
public conscience. Unfortunately, it seems that the message learned from the Danish 
cartoon controversy is that provoking violence is both acceptable and profitable. 337 If 
those threatening violence see that such an approach produces results, such threats are 
more likely to be employed in the future. For this reason, a terrorist’s veto must not be 
allowed to become a legitimate response to provocative speech.  
Finally, in contrast to the heckler’s veto, the violence threatened by the terrorist’s 
veto is often delayed.338 As mentioned in the context of prior restraints, imminent harm 
has traditionally been a vital check against government overreach and the censorship of 
unpopular ideas.339 Because the harm from a terrorist’s veto is not necessarily imminent 
or directly caused by the speech itself (like with the release of secrets, the fear caused by 
a true threat, or the traditional heckler’s veto scenario), there is abundant time for counter 
speech.340 As President Obama made clear, “the strongest weapon against hateful speech 
is not repression; it is more speech . . . .”341  
                                                           
334 See, e.g., Feiner, 340 U.S. at 315 (individual telling the police that he would shut up a soapbox preacher 
who had been preaching for approximately 30 minutes).  
335 See supra Section I.D. 
336 See Eugene Volokh, Sixth Circuit Agrees to Rehear “Heckler’s Veto” Decision, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/23/sixth-circuit-agrees-to-
rehear-hecklers-veto-decision/ (“Behavior that gets rewarded gets repeated. People who are willing to use 
violence to suppress speech will learn that such behavior is effective, at least when the police don’t come 
down particularly hard on the thuggery. Indeed, they may find at times that even merely threatening 
violence might suffice to suppress speech they dislike. And of course this message will be easily learned by 
the potentially violent of all religious and political stripes . . .”).  
337 See Eriksen, supra note 229, at 8 (“As a result of the polarisation resulting from the cartoon affair, 
Islamophobic Danes and militant Islamists were given ample media space, at the expense of almost 
everybody else. Abu Laban [an Islamic preacher] himself said to a German journalist in February: “I have 
to thank the government for its stubbornness.” His formerly marginal congregation grew rapidly in 2006.”). 
338 Feiner is a prototypical heckler’s veto case, which involved the immediate and potentially violent 
response to a soap box speaker in a public square. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 315. 
339 See supra Part II and Section III.A.  
340 Some have suggested that the requirement of imminence “is too narrow in scope to regulate the 
dissemination of public threats streaming on the Internet.” See Tsesis, supra note 264, at 1166. This view is 
flawed. While it is true that offensive, inciting, or provocative material can remain latent on the internet and 
eventually trigger violence, the argument attributing this trait solely to the internet misses the mark. See 
Virginia Rose Priddy, War of the Words: Why False Statements Should Be Guaranteed First Amendment 
Protection, 47 GA. L. REV. 623, 644 (2013) (arguing that internet speech should not be proscribed “because 
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That counter-speech is an availment to provocative speech is abundantly clear. 
Despite the violence, the cartoon controversy also lead to many earnest discussions of the 
nature of freedom of expression and the need to respect religious viewpoints. With the 
release of controversial images, there are likely to be people on both sides who will 
exploit the controversy, but also a spirited debate is likely to begin.342 With the Danish 
cartoons in particular, peaceful protests and appeals to common decency and brotherhood 
were arguably far more successful than violence at truly impacting hearts and minds. This 
is the natural process of the marketplace where ideas can be criticized, debated and 
discussed.343 Any governmental involvement threatens to distort this process and cut off 
debate.  
The market has also shown itself to be quite adept at responding to the publication 
of such cartoons.344 Most U.S. newspapers, like the New York Times, made reasoned 
decisions not to republish the provocative cartoons.345 Networks, such as Comedy 
                                                                                                                                                                              
[of] the miniscule possibility of a physical outcry”). Although the internet has certainly made a variety of 
material more accessible, books, newspapers, and magazines have always allowed information to remain 
latent and available. For instance, an individual could pick up the Hit Man Manual years after publication 
and use it to commit an act of violence. See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(holding the publisher of the book Hit Man enjoyed no First Amendment protection in a wrongful death 
suit where the book was used to assist and instruct murderers in soliciting, preparing for, and committing 
murders). Furthermore, the internet has the additional benefit of also making counter-speech more 
accessible than ever. Individuals can respond directly to provocative or inciting material and, because of the 
nature of internet searching these responses, have a good chance of being seen in conjunction with the 
initial speech. If it is true that speech doctrines like fighting words and incitement “are of very limited 
relevance to the Internet,” perhaps that is an argument for the abolition of these exceptions rather than an 
argument for their expansion. 
341 Obama, supra note 16.  
342 Indeed, some have suggested that speech arousing extreme emotion is highly conducive to free 
discourse. As Justice Douglas argued in his dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, “Emotions sway speakers 
and audiences alike. Intemperate speech is a distinctive characteristic of man. Hot-heads blow off and 
release destructive energy in the process. They shout and rave, exaggerating weaknesses, magnifying error, 
viewing with alarm.” 343 U.S. 250, 286–87 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
343 For a discussion on the origin of the phrase “marketplace of ideas,” see Ronald K.L. Collins, Holmes’ 
Idea Marketplace – Its Origins & Legacy, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (May 13, 2010), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/holmes%E2%80%99-idea-marketplace-%E2%80%93-its-origins-
legacy. Of course, the marketplace of ideas has perhaps as many detractors as it has supporters. For 
instance, Professor Ingber wrote that the marketplace of ideas simply serves to favor entrenched power and 
ideology. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984). Joseph 
Blocher persuasively advances a “New Institutional First Amendment” model of the marketplace that 
focuses on the role of marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing institutions. The threat of violence can be seen as 
adding an additional opportunity cost to the exchange of unpopular ideas, which makes such institutions 
such as the media less likely to convey such ideas. See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 822 (2008).  
344 See Rick Gladstone & Ravi Somaiya, New Charlie Hebdo Cover Creates New Questions for U.S. News 
Media, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/world/europe/new-charlie-hebdo-
cover-creates-new-questions-for-us-news-media.html.  
345 As Ronald Dworkin argued, the decision not to republish the cartoons was often a wise one when 
considering the harm that republication could cause and the minimal additional benefit that would come 
from republishing images that were widely available online. See Ronald Dworkin, The Right to Ridicule, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/mar/23/the-right-to-
ridicule/. See also Margaret Sullivan, A Close Call on Publication of Charlie Hebdo Cartoons, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/charlie-hebdo-
cartoon-publication-debate/?_r=0 (describing the Times decision not to publish the cartoons). 
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Central, also engaged in self-censorship when the creators of South Park wished to show 
an image of the Muhammad.346 Indeed, these acts of self-censorship have been heavily 
criticized as cowing in the face of terrorism.347 Nevertheless, these acts of self-censorship 
suggest that the media is capable of self-regulation.348 Thus, the publication of such 
cartoons differs from categories of speech where counter-speech is unavailable, and 
government intervention is necessary. The additional fear of government censorship 
would create an even stronger chilling effect, which would disincentivize the publication 
of politically controversial cartoons.349 Instead, media organizations need to have 
confidence that the government will do everything to protect them as they publish 
controversial material.350 
Some have argued that because Islamic cultures where the violent backlash often 
occurs do not fully embrace the norms of freedom of expression, that the marketplace 
                                                           
346 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
347 See Scott Collins & Matea Gold, Threat Against ‘South Park’ Creators Highlights Dilemma for Media 
Companies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/23/entertainment/la-et-south-
park-20100423 (quoting Professor Eugene Volokh who argues that “[t]he consequence of this position is 
that the thugs win and people have more incentive to be thugs.”); see also Jerry Birenz, We Are All Danes, 
COMM. LAW., Winter 2006, at 2; Gene Policinski, Riots over Muhammad Cartoons Challenge Freedoms, 
FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/riots-over-muhammad-cartoons-
challenge-freedoms. But see Leibowitz, supra note 204, at 524 (“[S]elf-censorship does not necessarily 
need to be founded in fear, but can be the result of thoughtful planning and open dialogue between 
representatives of different cultural groups.”). 
348 See John Scalzi, Disorganized Thoughts on Free Speech, Charlie Hebdo, Religion and Death, 
WHATEVER (Jan. 11, 2015), http://whatever.scalzi.com/2015/01/11/disorganized-thoughts-on-free-speech-
charlie-hebdo-religion-and-death/ (“[T]here really are millions of Muslims who are just trying to get 
through their day like anyone else, who also strongly prefer that Muhammad is not visually represented. 
It’s not a defeat for either the concept or right of free speech for people or organizations to say 
they’re factoring these millions or [sic] people who neither did nor would do anything wrong into 
their consideration of the issue.”). 
349 Professor Kendrick has questioned the chilling effect both as an empirical and theoretical matter. 
However, one flaw with Kendrick’s argument is that he does not adequately distinguish between media 
defendants and other individuals. Indeed, the various instances of media self-censorship regarding re-
publication of the Muhammad cartoons suggest that the media is already very responsive to incentives and 
disincentives. There is no reason to think that the media would be any less sensitive to the threat of 
litigation or criminal punishment than it is to other disincentives. See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and 
the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1637 (2013) (questioning whether the chilling effect can 
justify speech protections); see also David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current 
Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 508 (2001) (discussing how New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
led to a culture where the media is unafraid to publish controversial content). See also Blocher supra note 
343 (discussing “marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing institutions”). 
350 The recent controversy over the release of the film The Interview seems to suggest a renewed 
willingness on the part of the Obama Administration to stand up to the terrorist’s veto. Sony Pictures 
cancelled the theatrical release of a film that offended North Korea after the country threatened terrorist 
attacks. The Obama Administration criticized Sony’s decision to pull the film and may have been 
instrumental in getting it released. See Carrie Dann, Obama: Sony ‘Made a Mistake’ by Pulling ‘The 
Interview’ Movie, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2014, 3:22 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sony-
hack/obama-sony-made-mistake-pulling-interview-movie-n271786; North Korea Berates Obama over The 
Interview Release, BBC NEWS (Dec. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30608179. The 
Obama Administration also imposed new sanctions on North Korea as a result of their threats. See Dan 
Roberts, Obama Imposes New Sanctions Against North Korea in Response to Sony Hack, THE GUARDIAN 
Jan. 2, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/02/obama-imposes-sanctions-north-korea-
sony-hack-the-interview. 
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cannot be furthered by allowing such provocative speech.351 But such criticisms miss the 
mark for a few reasons.352 First, allowing such speech even in the face of potential 
violence sends a message about the robust nature and durability of the marketplace.353 
Second, the attacks spurned discussion both within Islam and elsewhere as to the proper 
response to offensive speech.354 Third, violent reactions serve as confirmation of the 
message of the cartoons that Islam has become far too intolerant of criticism and 
therefore serve to move society towards truth.355 Fourth, protecting provocative religious 
speech is vital for encouraging debate within Islam about the faith.356 The marketplace of 
ideas is not a “dated, pre-Internet covenant[]”357 as some have argued, but a vibrant and 
increasingly needed force. As the Supreme Court recently affirmed, “[t]he response to the 
unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the 
simple truth.”358 
                                                           
351 See Leibowitz, supra note 204, at 517 (“[H]ow is American society any closer to discovering ‘truth’ by 
permitting citizens like Terry Jones to engage in acts that they know are likely to spur almost immediate 
bloodshed of allied forces or peacekeepers abroad?”). 
352 Professor Kaminski has also argued that a lot of social and legal assumptions regarding crowd behavior 
are faulty. Accordingly, it may be wrong to see groups as an unthinking mass incapable of persuasion. His 
research suggests that crowds are more capable of responding to the marketplace of ideas than previously 
assumed. See Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash Mobs, 81 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 72 
(2012). 
353 Some scholars have argued that one of the main purposes of allowing robust free speech is to teach that 
ideas with which we disagree must nevertheless be tolerated. By tolerating some offensive, provocative and 
even intolerant speech, a society sends a message of the importance of tolerance. See ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 958 (4th ed. 2011); see also LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT 
SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 9–10 (1986). As Professor Bollinger 
explains, “containing that response, and learning something about its nature, is in fact a central lesson of 
the free speech principle.” Id. 
One other purpose of publishing or republishing provocative content may be to “spread the risk” and ensure 
that others feel free to speak out on controversial matters. See Stephen Law, What’s the Point of 
Lampooning Religion? To Upset the Religious?, CTR. FOR INQUIRY: THE OUTER LIMITS (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blogs/entry/whats_the_point_of_lampooning_religion_to_upset_the_religi
ous/. 
354 In this way the marketplace plays a function advocated by Professor Jack Balkin as “protecting and 
promoting a democratic culture.” Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); see also Alvarez, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2550 (“[S]uppression of speech by the government can make exposure of falsity more difficult, not 
less so.”). 
355 It is precisely because “[t]he speech that will be found most threatening by any society . . . is speech that 
questions the society’s assumptions and orthodoxies,” that robust protection is needed for such speech 
which is critical of orthodox or deeply held practices and policies. PHILLIPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS 
CAME TO SKOKIE 134 (1999). 
356 See Kenan Malik, Why Hate Speech Should Not Be Banned, PANDAEMONIUM (Apr. 19, 2012), 
https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/ (“Demanding that 
certain things cannot be said, whether in the name of respecting faith or of not offending cultures, is a 
means of defending the power of those who claim legitimacy in the name of that faith or that culture. It is a 
means of suppressing dissent, not from outside, but from within. What is often called offense to a 
community or a faith is actually a debate within that community or faith.”); see also Volokh, supra note 5 
(“Much within Islam—like much within many religions—merits some ‘afflicting’ through criticism and 
even ridicule.”). 
357 See Leibowitz, supra note 204, at 535. 
358 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550. 





Provocative speech, such as the publication of images of the Prophet Muhammad, 
deserves full constitutional protection. Unlike other types of unprotected speech, any 
attempts to proscribe such speech would focus not on the intrinsic quality of the speech, 
but on the reactions of third-parties to the speech. Such an approach would invariably 
create a terrorist’s veto, which distorts, rather than furthers, the marketplace of ideas. The 
Danish cartoons, and other provocative images of the Prophet Muhammad discussed in 
this article, were not intended to cause violence, but to evoke a global conversation on 
religious tolerance and freedom of expression. Those who respond with threats and acts 
of violence do a disservice to the free flow of ideas in a globalized world. It would be 
inappropriate to allow those who take offense to certain, perhaps unpopular, forms of 
expression to exercise a terrorist’s veto that effectively circumvents and diminishes this 
vital debate. 
